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1 
John G. Roberts, Jr. has now served more than five years as the seventeenth Chief Justice 
of the United States. He has held that position longer than Harlan Fiske Stone did and for nearly 
twice as many days as John F. Kennedy was President. 
Although Roberts’ judicial opinions, and those of the Court, offer jurisprudence to 
analyze, it is too early to reach definitive judgments regarding Roberts’ influence as Chief 
Justice or his success in that position. Roberts holds an office that, unique among high 
governmental positions, resists confident real-time assessment. 
The office of Chief Justice is cloaked in ambiguity and mystery. Most of what the Chief 
does publicly either resembles the work of the Associate Justices (i.e., opinion writing), involves 
administration of the federal judiciary, or seems ceremonial. The Chief’s administrative work 
may contribute importantly to the functioning of the judiciary,1 yet these labors do not provide 
1 For instance, William Howard Taft was instrumental in securing passage of the Judges Act of 
1925, which made most of the Court’s docket discretionary. Henry J. Abraham, Justices, 
Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to 
Bush II 238–239 (5th ed., Rowan & Littlefield 2008) (describing Warren Burger’s administrative 
achievements); Earl M. Maltz, The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969–1986, 10–11 (U. 
S.C. Press 2000) (also describing the administrative achievements of Warren Burger); Sandra 
Day O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice 141–145 
(Random House 2003) (discussing the initial skepticism that greeted Burger’s administrative 
reforms); Robert J. Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court 184–185, 187–
192 (U. S.C. Press 1986) (discussing the administrative reforms of Chief Justice Burger); see 
generally Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States: More 
Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 Const.  Commentary 57 (1994) (discussing the 
2 
the usual measure for assessing his contributions.  Instead, history typically evaluates Chief 
Justices based largely on their perceived impact on the Court’s institutional standing and on its 
decisions and opinions, particularly those regarding constitutional interpretation. Yet measuring 
that influence is difficult. 
The formal powers of the Chief Justice regarding the Court’s work are few—presiding at 
conference and assigning opinions when in the majority—and the linkage between a Chief’s 
action and historic effect is often inscrutable. Most of that activity which may significantly and 
distinctively affect the Court’s work occurs behind closed doors, obscured from the view of all 
but a few observers. Those who witness it, primarily the other Justices, generally maintain a 
discrete silence, at least while the Chief presides, other than tossing occasional public praise his 
way.  
The necessary customs of a small, collegial judicial institution may mandate these 
characteristics of invisible interactions and contemporary confidentiality but those habits 
postpone informed judgment by denying outside observers critical information. Though these 
attributes characterize the Supreme Court generally, the Roberts Court presents some additional 
impediments to assessment. It has experienced a high degree of turnover with four new 
members, including the Chief, in five years.2 That amount of transition in personnel imposes new 
challenges for many members, including the Chief. New members must become acclimated to 
nonjudicial responsibilities of Chief Justice); Steamer, supra n. 1, at 16 (arguing that Taft’s term 
saw the Chief Justice become the head of the judiciary rather than simply the presiding officer of 
the Court. 
2 S. Ct. of the U.S., Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,  
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Jan. 26, 2011).
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the Court’s work, practices, and personalities; continuing Justices must familiarize themselves 
with colleagues who have different attitudes, experiences, and styles than their predecessors.  
The new members include a new Chief Justice who many had previously experienced as an 
advocate or lower court judge. The retirements of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David Souter, 
and John Paul Stevens necessarily impacted the group dynamic by removing some powerful 
personalities from the institutional mix. Turnover also puts some members in new roles. Anthony 
Kennedy now is senior to all but the Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia. Stevens’ retirement means 
that Kennedy gets to assign the opinion when he joins the four “liberal” Justices. These changes 
mark the Court as an institution currently in flux. Some time is needed before the Justices adjust 
to a changed context and before the component parts arrange themselves in discernible and 
predictable patterns. 
 Moreover, Roberts’ youth when appointed—he was fifty—raises the prospect that these 
first five years may be but a fragment of a tenure which could rival in length John Marshall’s 
thirty-four year run. Even if Roberts does not match that record, life tenure and the actuarial 
tables would predict that his service will substantially exceed the seventeen-year average of his 
three most recent predecessors.3 Thus, Roberts may still be in the early moments of his tenure, a 
possibility that carries two significant consequences which, taken together, present a historical 
dilemma. The likely longevity of his term may allow him to exert a relatively unique impact on 
the Court and on American law. Nonetheless, much information regarding his leadership may 
remain hidden for some time, until his colleagues are willing to speak frankly and until his 
papers and those of other Justices are made available for scholars to assess. The history of his 
3 Id.
4 
Chief Justiceship is being made, yet the history of his leadership will not be heard,4 at least for a 
while. 
 Even though circumstances will defer informed assessments of Roberts’ impact, the 
patterns of the recent past may provide some useful analytical tools to help anticipate the 
likelihood that Roberts will exert influence as Chief Justice and the ways he might do so.  
Although the Chief Justice has “scant inherent powers”5 and some suggest his office carries “no 
more authority than other members of the [C]ourt,”6 anecdotal evidence suggests that a Chief can 
make a substantial difference, in discrete cases and in the overall operation of the Court.7
Historically, informed governmental observers have cared deeply who becomes Chief Justice, 
and their behavior provides some evidence that the office is consequential.8
4 Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,  705 (2007) 
(Roberts himself wrote “but when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history 
will be heard.”) 
5 Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 192 (Simon & Schuster 1964). 
6 Bernard Schwartz, A History of  the  Supreme Court 246 (Oxford U. Press 1993). See also Felix 
Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 901 (1953) (Stating that “[a]side 
from the power to assign the writing of opinions . . . a Chief Justice has no authority that any 
other member of the Court has[ no]t” and that the Court, was really “an institution in which 
every man is his own sovereign. The Chief Justice is primus inter pares.”)  
7 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 899–902.  
8 When Chief Justice Fuller died on July 4, 1910,  several members of the Court wanted to 
succeed him and significant lobbying occurred before President Taft nominated Justice Edward 
White. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 133–134. When White died on May 19, 1921, Taft became Chief 
5 
Some consensus suggests that during the last century there have been at least two great 
Chiefs— Charles Evans Hughes and Earl Warren9—although some would add a third, William 
Justice. Id. at 135. This was after making clear that he would not accept appointment as an 
Associate Justice and after having previously declined such appointments. Mason, supra n. 5, at 
17. When Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone died on April 22, 1946, some Justices reportedly sent 
word to President Truman that they would resign if Justice Robert Jackson became Chief Justice. 
When Truman instead nominated Fred Vinson, Jackson sent an unprecedented cable to two 
Congressional committee chairs blasting Justice Hugo Black who he suspected of undermining 
his prospects for elevation. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Black v. Jackson: A Study in Judicial Enmity, in  
The Unmaking of a Whig 3, 42–49 (Geo. U. Press 1990). Presidents care, too. Taft stewed over 
the appointment in 1910, as did Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, and Truman in 1946. Lyndon B. 
Johnson so wanted to elevate his friend, Justice Abe Fortas, that he ignored warning signs that 
such an appointment would receive a hostile reception. And senators place great stock in who 
occupies the center chair. Republicans and Southern Democrats invested considerable energies in 
successfully filibustering Fortas’s promotion even though it would not change the Court’s 
composition. When Ronald Reagan nominated Justice William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice, 
Senate Democrats focused on contesting his nomination but essentially ignored that of Judge 
Antonin Scalia who Reagan had nominated for Rehnquist’s seat even though Rehnquist’s 
elevation would not change the composition of the Court, whereas Scalia’s confirmation would. 
9 See Steamer, supra n. 1, at 36 (identifying Hughes and Warren, along with John Marshall, as 
great Chief Justices); Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of Leadership, 84 Yale L.J.
405, 405–406 (1975) (describing Marshall and Hughes’ leadership as “outstanding” and stating 
that Warren should be included in that “special category”).
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Howard Taft.10 At least three others—Harlan Fiske Stone, Fred Vinson, and Warren Burger— 
are regarded as pretty unsuccessful measured by their leadership of the Court’s decisionmaking 
efforts.11
The modest, some might say meager, formal powers of a Chief Justice may allow, but 
certainly do not guarantee, judicial leadership.12 Whether a Chief leads, and leads well, depends 
on his capacity to exploit the opportunities the powers provide. This ability turns on his 
possession of intangible qualities, which are unevenly distributed among those who occupy the 
center chair. Between his two stints on the Court (at a time when he presumably thought his 
chance to be Chief Justice had passed), Hughes wrote that the Chief’s “actual influence will 
depend upon the strength of his character and the demonstration of his ability in the intimate 
10 Abraham, supra n. 1, at 5–7, 158, 203; see id. at 147 (arguing that Taft was not a great Chief 
Justice despite his administrative and technical leadership); Mason, supra n. 5, at 304 (observing 
that Taft was not commonly regarded as a great Chief Justice). 
11 Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11 (arguing that Burger was not a distinguished Chief Justice based on his 
role in jurisprudential leadership); Alpheus T. Mason, The Chief Justice of the United States: 
Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. Pub. L. 20 (1968) (stating that Stone “suffered from administrative 
ineptitude”);  see generally Abraham, supra n. 1, at 183–184, 191, 238–240 (discussing Stone’s 
“less [than] satisfactory” role as Chief Justice, Vinson’s “lack of leadership,” and Burger’s 
“marginally successful attempts” to shift the judicial position). 
12 David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in Walter F. 
Murphy et al., Courts, Judges, & Politics 675, 676 (6th ed., McGraw-Hill 2006) (stating that the 
office of Chief Justice “does not guarantee leadership”). 
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relations of the judges.”13  Professor David Danelski essentially echoed this conclusion in an 
important article a half century ago; he concluded that a Chief Justice’s “actual influence 
depends upon his esteem, ability, and personality and how he performs his various roles.”14
This Hughes-Danelski assessment seems clearly correct. Yet the experiences of Chief 
Justices during the last century suggest two refinements. First, there is no one model of 
background or conduct that  predictsgreatness as a Chief Justice. The traits that seem to correlate 
well with success as Chief Justice are intangible qualities of leadership, not any characteristics 
that lend themselves to easy measurement. Second, the influence of a Chief Justice inevitably 
depends on contextual factors as well as on personal attributes. Whether a Chief Justice can lead, 
and how, depends on the opportunities history provides, and those vary from Chief to Chief and 
often during any one incumbency. 
Part I of this Article will outline the thesis of Danelski’s 1960 article and apply it to the 
seven Chief Justices from Taft to Rehnquist. Relying on these sketches, Part II will discuss the 
impact of context on the Chief’s influence. Part III will suggest that tangible qualities and 
particular practices do not correlate well with success as Chief Justice. Part IV will apply some 
of these generalizations to Roberts before Part V offers conclusions. 
I. The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process 
A. The Danelski Formulation 
Fifty years ago, David J. Danelski published a short study of the Chief Justice’s influence 
in the Court’s decisionmaking process based on his review of Court papers during the Taft, 
13 Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 57 (Garden City Publg. Co. 
1928). 
14 Danelski, supra n. 12, at 676. 
8 
Hughes, and Stone chief justiceships. He identified task and social leadership as two distinct 
activities that contributed to the success and cohesion of the Court.15 The former role focused on 
the Court’s work to reach a decision whereas the latter emphasized the need of the members of 
the institution to remain sufficiently cohesive, socially, to accomplish its work. The Chief’s 
success in performing those roles is not assured but is contingent on his or her mix of skills as 
perceived by his or her colleagues, “his [or her] esteem, ability, and personality and how he [or 
she] performs his [or her] roles.”16
Danelski suggested that the Chief Justice, as the presiding officer at the conference, was 
in a favorable but not inevitable position to exert “both task and social leadership.”17 The Chief 
Justice typically presented the cases to the conference, which Danelski regarded as “an important 
task function.”18 Although Danelski did not spell out the advantages associated with case 
presentation, presumably that function allows the Chief to frame the issues, a prerogative that 
may effectively steer discussion in a particular direction. Moreover, the right to be the first to 
state a position  affords the Chief the opportunity to suggest a resolution before anyone else has 
verbally committed. Thus, presumably, the order of speaking at conference gives the Chief 
persuading advantages over those who only get to weigh in after others have already stated their 
views. Minds can and do change but most are more persuadable before, not after, they have 
shared a conclusion. Finally, the assignment power that the Chief exercises when in the majority 






Danelski pointed out that presiding at conference also positioned the Chief to exercise 
critical social functions. He was in position “to invite suggestions and opinions, seek 
compromises, and cut off debate which appears to be getting out of hand.”19 His ability to engage 
his colleagues yet manage their interaction could contribute to the Court’s cohesion, or lack 
thereof. 
Danelski also explored the importance of the opinion assigning role, which falls to the 
Chief when he is part of the majority. That function presented four instrumental challenges: 
producing a valuable precedent, winning public acceptance for a decision, preserving a majority 
when the Court was divided, and massing the Court. 
Finally, Danelski concluded that unifying the Court was among the Chief’s “most 
important roles.”20 Quite clearly, the Chief’s skill as a task and social leader and in assigning 
opinions would contribute to his success in this role. So, too, would the extent to which he 
emphasized unanimity as a judicial norm. 
B. Successful Chief Justices 
1. Charles Evans Hughes 
Hughes’ great success as Chief Justice related in part to his ability to merge the roles of 
task and social leader. Danelski proclaimed Hughes “the most esteemed member of his Court” in 
large part due to his commanding performance at conference.21 Hughes’ work won the respect of 
his colleagues. “Few men have been so fitted by talent and disposition to carry the heavy burden 
19 Id.
20 Id. at 681. 
21 Id. at 677. 
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which unavoidably rests on the Chief Justice,” wrote Stone.22 “He was master of the business,” 
said Frankfurter,23 who likened Hughes presiding to Toscanini conducting.24
The Chief Justice’s case-stating prerogative probably contributed to Hughes’ influence 
even more than it enhanced that of his predecessors or successors. By all accounts, Hughes was 
an outstanding lawyer with a keen analytical mind and a formidable memory. He labored over 
case files until he had mastered them. At conference, he stated cases succinctly yet 
comprehensively, precisely, and impartially.25 The case having been presented, he concluded by 
22 Harlan F. Stone, The Chief Justice, 27 ABA. J. 407 (July 1941). 
23 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 901. 
24 Id. See also Felix Frankfurter, “The Administrative Side” of Chief Justice Hughes, 63 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (1949)(“He knew that the manner of conducting the business of the Court affects the 
matter….In Court and in conference, he struck the pitch, as it were, for the orchestra.”). 
25 Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes 664–665, 673 (Macmillan Co. 1951); Owen J. Roberts, 
Charles Evans Hughes: The Administrative Master in Alan F. Westin, An Autobiography of the 
Supreme Court 205, 208 (Greenwood Press 1963); Stone, supra n. 22 , at 407 (referring to 
Hughes’ “extraordinary power of accurate and luminous statement”); Transcriptions of 
Conversations Between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette 
No. 1: December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas1 
.html (accessed Jan. 24, 2011) (“Hughes covered all those in a very, very efficient way. One of 
the reasons that he did that was, first, he had tremendous capacity, an unusual capacity to get 
things done very fast.”); Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by 
Chief Justice Hughes, 63Harv. L. Rev. 5, 14-15, 17 (1949) (discussing Hughes’s skill in stating 
cases and his elaborate preparation for conference). 
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offering his preferred resolution, and his statements of proposed dispositions often commanded 
assent.26 After listening to discussion, Hughes then summarized the Court’s position and reacted 
to the comments of the other Justices.27
In addition to Hughes’ task leadership, Danelski regarded him as the social leader of the 
Court who acted to ensure its cohesion.28 Hughes was not a backslapping extrovert but 
maintained warm relations with his brethren, some of whom he had known for years before 
becoming Chief Justice.29 Hughes was sensitive to the personalities and psychic needs of his 
26 Roberts, supra n. 25, at 208. 
27 Pusey, supra n. 25, at 675; Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv. 
L. Rev. 4, 40 (1967). 
28 Danelski, supra n. 12, at 677.
29 Hughes had served with Justices Holmes, Van Devanter, and McReynolds during his first stint 
on the Court. Charles Evans Hughes, The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes 298 
(David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., Harv. U. Press 1973). Hughes maintained warm 
relations with them, even with the incorrigible McReynolds, who reportedly deferred to him. 
Pusey, supra n. 25, at 667–668, 670–671. Hughes was particularly friendly with Van Devanter 
from their prior service. William G. Ross, The Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes, 
1930–1941,  at 1919 (U. S.C. Press 2007). Hughes and Brandeis had overlapped for only a few 
days in June 1916, but they had known each other as practicing lawyers and had a warm 
relationship. Hughes, supra n. 29, at 171, 298. Hughes and Cardozo were old friends long before 
Hoover nominated Cardozo to succeed Holmes. Id. at 299–300; Pusey, supra n. 25, at 682. 
Hughes had served in Herbert Hoover’s Cabinet with Harlan Fiske Stone. Hughes, supra n. 29, 
12 
colleagues, and he presided with tact. Hughes treated his colleagues in a courteous manner and 
did not let jurisprudential disagreements affect his interactions with them.30
Hughes’ command in conference was no doubt enhanced by his behavior towards the 
other Justices outside of it. When Justice Van Devanter fell behind in his opinions, Hughes 
would sometimes reclaim some assigned cases, but always with the comment that Van Devanter 
had been overburdened.31 The anti-Semitic McReynolds avoided social encounters with Louis 
Brandeis, so Hughes divided his colleagues between two annual dinners he hosted.32 Hughes 
developed and maintained a close rapport with Owen Roberts,33 and when Roberts was 
hospitalized for three weeks, Hughes visited him every weekday.34 Knowing that Cardozo would 
immediately begin working on an opinion on Saturday night if he received an assignment after 
the conference, Hughes withheld Cardozo’s allotment until Sunday or Monday to protect his 
health.35 So Cardozo would not feel singled out, Hughes also deferred sending assignments to 
Van Devanter, Cardozo’s neighbor.36 He handled the delicate mission of suggesting to Holmes 
that it was time for the ninety-year-old to retire with such tact that Holmes immediately took the 
at 298. Brandeis and McReynolds, representing opposite wings of the Court, both endorsed 
Hughes’s nomination. Ross, supra n. 29, at 19–20. 
30 Ross, supra n. 29, at 28, 219. 
31 Pusey, supra n. 25, at 667–668. 
32 Id. at 670. 
33 Hughes, supra n. 29, at 298. 
34 Pusey, supra n. 25, at 669. 
35 William O. Douglas, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 549, 549 (1960).
36 Pusey, supra n. 25, at 678.  
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hint free of ill feeling.37 Hugo Black had voted against Hughes’ nomination as Chief Justice and 
had advocated the court-packing plan; yet, Hughes treated him with such courtesy and respect 
that Black became an admirer.38 Hughes never lobbied other Justices outside of the conference 
room although he was open to discussing a case if approached.39
Hughes facilitated the Court’s work and generally won points with his colleagues by his 
efficient administration. He conducted Court business in a manner that was respectful of his 
colleagues’ calendars. Conferences began on schedule, and Hughes enforced the time allotted to 
oral advocates (it was said, perhaps apocryphally, that he once cut an advocate off in the middle 
of the word “if”) and was not afraid to end oral argument when no longer needed. Hughes 
typically circulated a list of cases he deemed unworthy of certiorari.40 Although it was 
understood that any of the cases would be discussed at the request of a single Justice, such 
requests came about once every other year of Hughes’ Chief Justiceship.41
37 Id. at 681–682. 
38 Id. at 773. 
39 Hughes, supra n. 29, at 301; Pusey, supra n. 25, at 676–677; Roberts, supra n. 25, at 209–210 
(stating that Hughes never discussed merits of cases with other Justices between argument and 
conference). 
40 Pusey, supra n. 25, at 672.
41 Id. Hughes’s efficient approach did not meet with universal acclaim. Stone thought Hughes ran 
conference like a “drill sergeant.” Ross, supra n. 29, at 221. This left inadequate time for 
collective rumination of matters before the Court. Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal 
Court : The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 101–103 (Oxford U. Press 1998). Stone 
tried to fill this gap by sometimes holding Friday afternoon rump sessions, which a few Justices 
14 
Hughes put a good deal of thought into case assignments, which he considered his “most 
delicate task.”42 Although Hughes claimed that he tried to distribute important cases equally,43 he 
was not averse to keeping a disproportionate number for himself (twenty-eight percent), a 
smaller percentage than Taft retained (thirty-four precent) but far more than did Stone (eleven 
percent).44 He kept some   important opinions for himself but also shouldered his share of the 
pedestrian cases.45 He often assigned controversial cases to the Justice close to the Court’s center 
to minimize division.46 He tended to assign each Justice a range of cases47 while considering the 
“special fitness of a Justice for writing in the particular case.”48
attended. Ross, supra n. 29, at 222; Melvin Urofsky, Division and Discord: The Supreme Court 
under Stone and Vinson, 1941–1953, at 31 (U. S.C. Press 1997).  
42 Hughes, supra n. 29, at 302; see also Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 904 (“No Chief Justice, I 
believe, equaled Chief Justice Hughes in the skill and the wisdom and the disinterestedness with 
which he made his assignments.”) 
43 Hughes, supra n. 29, at 302. 
44 David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 260–261(W.W. 
Norton 2005). To some extent, these numbers may reflect the Chief picking up the slack for ill or 
less productive colleagues, as was true of Taft, for instance. See Ross, supra n. 29, at 230 (listing 
significant cases Hughes assigned himself). 
45 Roberts, supra n. 25, at 209. 
46 Freund, supra n. 27, at 40. 
47 Pusey, supra n. 25, at 678; Ross, supra n. 29, at 229. 
48 Hughes, supra n. 29, at 302. 
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Finally, Hughes worked to achieve a consensus as broad as the Court’s composition 
allowed. In part, he led by example. He rarely wrote dissenting opinions, and his institutional 
commitment often caused him to acquiesce silently in a disposition rather than publish his 
disagreement.49
 Hughes quite clearly commanded the admiration of the Brethren, many of whom 
effusively praised his leadership. Frankfurter said that Hughes “radiated authority, not through 
any other quality than the intrinsic moral power that was his.”50 Douglas regarded Hughes as “a 
great man.”51 So, too, did those who observed Hughes in action. Robert Jackson wrote of 
Hughes’ “impressive personality” and said he “imparted strength to the Court during our time by 
his character.”52 Paul Freund, who encountered Hughes as a law clerk to Brandeis, as an attorney 
before the Court, and as a scholar, compared Hughes to John Marshall as a Chief Justice.53
2. Earl Warren
49 Freund, supra n. 27, at 37–38 (reporting that Hughes wrote only seventeen dissents and six 
concurrences out of more than two hundred and fifty opinions). 
50 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 901. 
51 Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. 
Murphy, Cassette No. 7a: January 18, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/ 
douglas/douglas7a.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2011). 
52 Robert H. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in The 
Supreme Court and Its Justices 142–143 (Jesse H. Chopper ed., 2d ed., ABA 2001). 
53 Freund, supra n. 27, at 43. 
16 
Warren lacked Hughes’ technical skill as lawyer yet apparently presided with welcome 
authority.54 His popularity among his colleagues disposed them in his favor, and he apparently 
provided able case summaries that highlighted the basic issues for decision followed with a clear 
statement of his position, except in an occasional technical matter where he indicated he would 
join any majority for lack of his own preference.55 Warren reportedly presided in a fair and 
efficient manner and resisted the urge to argue with his colleagues, a practice that had 
undermined Stone’s authority.56 Warren’s colleagues regarded him as persuasive in conference 
and a hard worker.57  He drew on the skill of others to enhance his own performance. Warren and 
Black often discussed pending cases before and after conferences.58 After Brennan joined the 
54 Michael Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969, at 22–23 (U. S.C. Press 
2005) (quoting Stewart that Warren was “ideal” in presiding over the conference).
55 Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court 143–144 (N.Y.U. Press 
1983).
56 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice Warren, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1974) (praising 
Warren’s skills presiding over conference); Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 144 (stating that Stone felt 
Warren always had to get in the last word). 
57 Interview by T. H. Baker with Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (July 10, 1969) 
(transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ 
MarshallT/marshall.pdf) [hereinafter Marshall Interview].  
58 Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made 348 (Penguin Group 2006). 
17 
Court, Warren regularly strategized with him, meeting every Thursday before conference in 
Brennan’s chambers.59
Warren reportedly provided simple, but effective, statements of cases that focused 
discussion on the underlying moral values at issue. Warren’s eloquent statement at the December 
12, 1953 conference on Brown v. Board of Education60 was noteworthy in this respect.61
Although Warren said he favored “pooling all of the humble wisdom of the Court[,]” he 
proceeded to state that “separate but equal” rested on the “basic premise that the Negro race is 
inferior,” a conclusion Warren rejected as inconsistent with the three Civil War Amendments.62
Warren’s comments, when coupled with the prior term’s discussion of the case, signaled that a 
clear majority existed to overturn Plessy and placed the constitutional issue in a moral frame that 
virtually compelled the ultimate decision.63 Moreover, Warren astutely invited the conference to 
discuss, but not to vote on, the case to make it easier for those with misgivings about overturning 
59 Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 106, 183, 250–252 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010); Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. Times 6 (Oct. 5, 
1986). 
60 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
61 Notes of Conference of December 12, 1953, in The Supreme Court in Conference: 1940–1985, 
at 654 (Del Dickson ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) [hereinafter The Supreme Court in Conference].
62 Id.
63 See e.g. G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 165 (Oxford U. Press 1982) (arguing 
that Warren’s statement used moral shame to attract support). 
18 
Plessy to change their minds later.64 Although Warren was not solely responsible for achieving 
the unanimous result in Brown, he surely played an important role.65
Brown was by no means the only instance when Warren’s opening identified a broad 
principle that the Court adopted. In Miranda v. Arizona,66 Warren’s conference statement 
articulated the basic ideals and specific requirements that later found their way into his opinion 
and commanded the essential assent of five others.67  In Loving v. Virginia,68 he declared that the 
Equal Protection Clause was designed to eliminate racial discrimination, but that miscegenation 
statutes “maintain white supremacy.”69 Bernard Schwartz found from his review of conference 
notes that Warren was usually able to lead the Court in the direction he chose.70
Warren also excelled as a social leader, and his popularity with his colleagues 
presumably enhanced his influence. He had immense interpersonal skills. The simple acts of a 
64 Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. 
Murphy, Cassette No. 13: December 17, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/ 
douglas/douglas13.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2011). 
65 Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 
1948–1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (1979). 
66 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
67 The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 61, at 515–518. 
68 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
69 The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 61, at 695. 
70 Bernard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action 12 (Addison-
Wesley 1990); see also Belknap, supra n. 54, at 22 (stating that Warren could usually steer 
conference discussion). 
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master politician paid important dividends. When Warren first arrived at the Court, he went 
directly to Black’s chambers and introduced himself to Black’s office staff and law clerks—a 
gesture Black appreciated.71 He asked Black for a reading list to help with opinion writing, and 
after Black suggested Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Warren immediately began to read it.72 He invited 
Black, as senior Justice, to continue to preside at conference initially. Warren greeted Potter 
Stewart and his wife at the train station at 6:30 a.m. when they first arrived in Washington, 
D.C.73 Warren routinely met other Justices, even those most junior, in their chambers rather than 
summoning them to his, persisting in the practice even when they protested that protocol 
demanded that they visit him.74 This show of humility—institutional and personal—helped 
endear Warren to his associates. Warren personally hand-delivered his draft of the opinion in 
Brown to each of his colleagues, even taking it to Jackson in the hospital,75 a gesture that 
signaled deference of a new Chief Justice for a senior colleague and afforded an opportunity for 
conversation, in addition to addressing the underlying confidentiality concerns associated with 
transporting the opinion outside of the Court. Warren won favor with other actions too, like 
lobbying Congress (unsuccessfully) to provide cars and drivers for the Justices76 or resisting 
71 Newton, supra n. 58, at 277.
72 Id. at 277–278. 
73 Belknap, supra n. 54, at 21; Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 321. 
74 See generally Leeds, supra n. 59 (citing Warren’s practice of meeting Brennan in his chambers 
as a reflection of Warren’s view that he was “Chief among equals”); Marshall Interview, supra
n. 57. 
75 Hutchinson, supra n. 65, at 42.
76 Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 347–348 (Doubleday & Co. 1977). 
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efforts to increase the differential between his salary and that of the associate Justices from five-
hundred dollars to twenty-five hundred dollars.77
Warren also cultivated his colleagues socially—an enterprise that must have come 
naturally for someone Brennan recalled as being “marvelous with people.”78 Warren and his 
family spent holidays with the Blacks; he hunted79 and walked80 with Clark; and he attended 
sporting events and otherwise regularly socialized with Brennan.81 He persuaded all of his 
colleagues (except Black and Frankfurter) to join him at the Army-Navy football game most 
years; the Justices traveled to the game by rail during which time they socialized with one 
another and their families over breakfast and dinner.82
Save for Frankfurter and sometimes Douglas, Warren’s colleagues spoke of him 
effusively.83 Brennan regarded him as “the Super-Chief.”84 Stewart called Warren “an instinctive 
77 Brennan, supra n. 56, at 3. 
78 Leeds, supra n. 59. 
79 Newton, supra n. 58, at 348. 
80 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 443. 
81 Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 59, at 105; Leeds, supra n. 59. 
82 Newton, supra n. 58, at 350; Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 59, at 104–105. 
83 The Douglas Letters 124–125 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., Adler & Adler 1987) (criticizing Warren 
in letters in spring, 1961); Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas 
and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 11: June 9, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/
~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas11.html) (accessed Jan. 26, 2011). 
84 Brennan, supra n. 56, at 5. 
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leader whom you respected and for whom you had an affection.”85 Clark thought Warren would 
be viewed as the equal to, or greater than, John Marshall;86 Douglas ranked him with Marshall 
and Hughes.87 Marshall described Warren as “one of the greatest people who ever lived” and 
thought history would rank him “probably the greatest Chief Justice who ever lived.”88 Goldberg 
exaggerated only slightly in judging Warren as “beloved by all his brethren.”89 Fortas said that 
Warren “provided an essence, an attitude, which set the tone and quality of the Court’s work.”90
Warren distributed assignments fairly, making an effort to give all members some 
opportunity to write important cases.91 As with other Chief Justices, he wrote many of the 
historic decisions, such as Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe,92 Reynolds v. Sims,93 Miranda v. Arizona, 
85 Belknap, supra n. 54, at 22. 
86 Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Tom Clark, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (Oct. 7, 1969) (transcript 
available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Clark-T/Clark-
T.PDF) .  
87 William O. Douglas, in Earl Warren—A Tribute, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 4 (1970).
88 Marshall Interview, supra n. 57. 
89 Arthur J. Goldberg, in Earl Warren—A Tribute, supra n. 87, at  6. 
90 Fortas, supra n. 9, at 411. 
91 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 30; Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Earl Warren, (Sept. 21, 1971) 
(transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/ 
Warren-E/Warren-e.pdf). 
92 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
93 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Loving, and Powell v. McCormack.94 Yet he also bore more than his share of those less 
coveted.95 He often relied on Brennan to write delicate opinions or to preserve a narrow majority, 
as in Cooper v. Aaron96 or Baker v. Carr.97 Yet strategic concerns probably dictated the 
assignments to Clark in Abington v. Schempp,98 Heart of Atlanta v. United States,99 and Mapp v. 
Ohio,100 and to Stewart in Katz v. United States101—cases where a more conservative author 
might help keep the majority intact and gain greater public acceptance.  
2. William Howard Taft 
The Taft tenure demonstrated that a Chief Justice can, under certain circumstances, be 
highly successful without providing both task and social leadership. Taft, according to Danelski, 
acted as the Court’s social leader while his appointee, friend, and ally, Van Devanter, emerged as 
the task leader of the conference.102 Taft’s good nature apparently paid dividends in easing 
tensions on the Court, and he quickly achieved cordial relations with Brandeis,103 with whom he 
94 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  Brennan did much of the drafting although the decision was issued as an 
opinion of all nine Justices.  Stern and Wemiel, supra note 59, at 145-152.
95 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 460–461. 
96 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
97 See id. at 418–419 (discussing strategic considerations in assignment to Brennan). 
98 347 U.S. 203 (1963).
99 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
100 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
101 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
102 Danelski, supra n. 12, at 677. 
103Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man’s Life 537–539 (Viking Press 1946). 
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had previously endured high-stakes, public, and acrimonious clashes.104 The rapprochement 
reflected their reciprocal efforts, but Taft certainly did his part, by going out of his way to be 
solicitous about Brandeis’ health and feelings and accommodating Brandeis’ views and 
suggestions when he could. Taft’s outreach was consistent with his “very genial”105 personality, 
but it also reflected his desire to have the Court work collegially as a team.106 Taft valued 
unanimity highly and accordingly tried to foster a climate conducive to compromise.107 The Taft 
Court demonstrated a high degree of cohesion, handing down unanimous decisions eighty-four 
percent of the time. Taft set an example in this respect, writing only about two dissents a year.108
Taft won favor with his colleagues generally by generous and sensitive gestures towards 
them, ranging from Christmas cards, rides, and gift salmons, to arranging for the funeral of Mrs. 
104 Brandeis had humiliated Taft during the investigation of Secretary of Interior Ballinger in 
1910 by demonstrating that Taft had lied in his statements about his own inquiry into matters in 
dispute. Six years later, Taft signed a letter along with former ABA presidents opposing 
Brandeis’s nomination to the Court on the grounds that he was unfit to serve. See generally
Mason, supra n. 5, at 199–200 (describing how the two men began to mend relations after this 
event). 
105 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 898 (describing Taft as having “great warmth” and “a great deal of 
comraderie about him”). 
106 See generally Mason, supra n. 5, at 193–206 (describing ways in which Taft promoted 
teamwork and unanimity). 
107 The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 61, at 74–75. 
108 O’Connor, supra n. 1, at 116–117. 
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Holmes at Arlington.109 Taft’s conduct in assigning opinions also no doubt endeared him to his 
colleagues. He wrote more than his share of the Court’s opinions, in part because he assigned 
himself cases in areas like patent law, which others preferred to avoid, and he took on extra work 
when a colleague was ill or fell behind.110 Brandeis credited Taft with “admirable” personal 
qualities, with smoothing out problems, and with conducting a harmonious conference.111
Although Taft lacked the legal skills that Hughes was to display, Van Devanter helped 
fill that void. Van Devanter’s writer’s block limited his output of opinions,112 but his knowledge 
of procedure, the Court’s precedents, and his ability at legal analysis were highly valued by his 
colleagues.113 He often strategized with Taft before conference and reviewed memoranda before 
109 Mason, supra n. 5, at 205; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter 
Conversations, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 299, 336 (quoting Brandeis as praising Taft’s generosity to 
other Justices). 
110 Mason, supra n. 5, at 205–206, 231–232 (reporting that Taft wrote one-sixth of the Court’s 
opinions and averaged ten opinions per year—more than his colleagues for most years); Urofsky, 
supra n. 109, at 321 (crediting Taft with assigning cases fairly).
111 Urofsky, supra n. 109, at 313, 322, 333.                                                                                                               
112 Abraham, supra note 1, at 136; Mason, supra note 5, at 209 (describing VanDevanter as 
“’opinion-shy’” and a “perfectionist”); Pusey, supra note 25, at 667-668 (referring to Van 
Devanter’s “’pen paralysis’” as “almost an affliction”).
113 .David Burner, Willis Van Devanter, in The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
1789-1978: Their Lives and Major Opinions 1945, 1948, 1952-1953(Leon Friedman and Fred L. 
Israel eds., Chelsea House, 1980).
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the Chief circulated them to the other chambers.114 Brandeis claimed that Van Devanter ran the 
Court due to his knowledge of federal law and his willingness to be helpful to his colleagues.115
C. Unsuccessful Chief Justices 
By contrast, the Chief Justiceships of Stone, Vinson, and Burger have not been regarded 
as successful in terms of leading the Court. The Court fell victim to internecine strife during the 
Chief Justiceships of  Stone and  Vinson, whom Herbert Johnson suggests “share the unenviable 
distinction of being perhaps the least collegial and most internally vindictive periods of the 
Court’s history.”116
1. Harlan Fiske Stone 
 Although Stone came highly recommended as Chief Justice,117 he proved miscast in the 
center seat. Stone conducted conference quite differently than Hughes, in part due to his reaction 
to Hughes’ style of leadership, in part because he valued unanimity less and dissents more, and 
in part due to his own temperament. Stone’s praise of Hughes for not seeking “unanimity at the 
cost of the sacrifice . . . of strongly held convictions” and for recognizing the historic role of 
114 Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, in The Supreme Court and Its 
Justices 319 (Jesse H. Choper ed., 2d ed., ABA 2001);Mason, supra n. 5, at 222; Alpheus 
Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: President by Chance, Chief Justice by Choice, in The 
Supreme Court and Its Justices, supra n. 114, at 139–140;  
115 Urofsky, supra n. 109, at 310. 
116 Herbert A. Johnson, Editor’s Preface, in Urofsky, supra n.41, at ix. 
117 Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone: Pillar of the Law 565–570 (The Viking Press 
1956) (reporting praise of Stone from Hughes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter among others). 
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dissents,118 probably described Stone’s values more accurately than Hughes’ performance. Stone 
was more the academic than the man of action—a jurist whose contributions came more from his 
pen than his command.   
Stone often came to conference without having reached a resolution of the matters for 
decision. His statements of cases lacked the authority of Hughes’ renditions and accordingly 
others embellished on them and competed for de facto leadership of the Court. Rather than 
presiding, he tended to join the debates.119  Believing Hughes’ efficiency sacrificed full 
exploration of the issues, Stone allowed discussion to continue interminably.120 Stone 
exacerbated matters by debating with others who differed with his views,121 thereby sacrificing 
any ability to police the discussions. Whatever the benefits of longer deliberations, they had 
negative byproducts.122 Disposing of the Court’s work became a more arduous enterprise as 
118 Stone, supra n. 22, at 408. 
119 Danelski, supra n. 12, at 678; Mason, supra n. 117, at 790–792 (describing conferences under 
Stone); Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor 
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 2: December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/ 
finding_aids/douglas/douglas2.html (accessed Feb. 9, 2011) (describing Stone’s practice of 
debating points made by each Justice who spoke). 
120 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 902–903. 
121 Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 152 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1975); 
Transcripts, supra n. 119 (describing Stone’s practice of debating points made by each Justice 
who spoke). 
122 See Mason, supra n. 117, at 793–794 (describing some of the consequences of long 
deliberations under Stone’s Chief Justiceship).
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additional sessions were required to complete deliberation. Rather than being Saturday’s work, 
conferences often continued on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.123 Moreover, disagreements  
between strong-willed members of the Black and Frankfurter wings of the Court often dominated 
the discussions and perhaps exacerbated some of the divisions between the Justices.124 Stone 
apparently made derogatory comments about Black, which later became known to Black, thereby 
tempering his regard for the Chief Justice.125
2. Fred Vinson 
Vinson lacked the legal skill of Hughes or Stone. He was a sociable person and a number 
of his colleagues liked him personally.126 That did not translate into professional respect, 
however, from colleagues who viewed him as lazy and lackluster.127 Frankfurter’s famous 
comment at Vinson’s funeral in September, 1953 (“This is the first indication I have ever had 
that there is a God.”)128 may have revealed more about Frankfurter than about Vinson, yet it 
123 William O. Douglas, Chief Justice Stone, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 693, 695 (1946). 
124 Lash, supra n. 121, at 207, 228; Mason, supra n. 117, at 793–795; O’Brien, supra n. 44, at 
197–198; Urofsky, supra n.41, at 39–40. 
125 Transcriptions No. 7a, supra n. 51. 
126Urofsky, supra n.41, at 149; Interview by Jerry Hess with Tom Clark, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. 
(Oct. 17, 1972) (transcript available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarktc.htm) 
(recalling Vinson as popular with other Justices). 
127 Urofsky, supra n. 41, at 149, 151. 
128 Abraham, supra n. 1, at 191; see also Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice 
William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No.17: June 5, 1963,
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reflected a perception that Vinson was more obstacle than answer in the Court’s effort to find a 
consensus solution in the then pending school-segregation cases. Even Henry Abraham’s effort 
to present an even-handed judgment concludes that “overall . . . Vinson demonstrated an 
astonishing lack of leadership: the role of [C]hief [J]ustice was simply beyond his ken.”129
Vinson at times upset colleagues by acting in the more autocratic manner of a congressional 
committee chair or cabinet official in circumstances when such hierarchical authority did not 
reside in the Chief Justice.130 Vinson, though not otherwise a successful Chief Justice, distributed 
majority opinions evenly and indeed kept few “plums” for himself.131 The Court rarely acted 
unanimously and dissents proliferated. 
3. Warren E. Burger 
Burger forfeited his roles of task and social leader by occasional inept and obtuse 
conduct. Like Stone and Vinson, he failed to impose structure on the conference, to his 
colleagues’ regret.132 His statements of the case were reportedly unimpressive and often 
http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas17.html) (describing Vinson as 
lacking “the elements of greatness” of other Chief Justices). 
129 Abraham, supra n. 1, at 191. 
130 Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. 
Murphy, Cassette No. 10: June 9, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/ 
douglas10.html) (discussing Vinson’s act in calling a special session of the Court to review the 
stay of execution in Rosenberg). 
131 John P. Frank, Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 212–213, 
241(1954). 
132 O’Brien, supra n. 44, at 200.
29 
incomplete.133 He imposed little discipline but allowed each Justice to interrupt others and speak 
as long as he or she wished.134 As a consequence, senior Justices often spoke multiple times 
before junior Justices were able to make their initial contribution, and often little was left to be 
said by the time the end of the queue was reached.135 Conferences frequently continued into the 
following day.136 Burger sometimes did not record conference votes correctly. Whether this 
failing was strategic or reflected carelessness, it was not appreciated.137 Burger did not 
distinguish himself as a jurist or command the respect of his colleagues.138 Other Justices rewrote 
a number of opinions in significant cases he assigned himself.139 Unlike Hughes, he was not a 
133  David Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court 52 (John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc. 1992).
134 O’Brien, supra n. 44, at 199. 
135 Id.; Savage, supra n. 133, at 52 (describing Burger’s unimpressive conference performance); 
Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 59, at 356 (describing Burger’s case discussions as rambling). 
136 Interview by Harold Hongju Koh with Harry Blackmun, Assoc. J., S. Ct. U.S. (Nov. 1, 1995) 
(transcript available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/page.html? 
page=366&size=640&SERIESID=D09&FOLDERID=D0901) [hereinafter Blackmun Interview]. 
137 O’Brien, supra n. 44, at 200, 202. 
138 See generally Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 257, 272, 284, 315 (Simon & 
Schuster 1979) (describing how Chief Justice Burger, at times, frustrated his colleagues with his 
leadership style). 
139 Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 59, at 357–358 (describing rewrites of Burger opinions in 
Alexander v. Holmes Co. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1975), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
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proficient technical lawyer, and unlike Warren, he did not identify compelling ideals to furnish a 
foundation for constitutional jurisprudence. Burger often joined but rarely formed majorities in 
important cases.140
Burger compounded his failings as a task leader with social shortcomings.141 He upset 
some members of the Court by moving a desk into the Court’s conference room and 
appropriating it as his reception room.142 Some colleagues resented his perceived practice of 
deferring initial comment and then strategically voting with the winning side so he, rather than 
Douglas or Brennan, would assign the Court’s opinion.143 His officious manner alienated 
Blackmun, his childhood friend.144 The disparaging portrait of Burger in The Brethren, 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)); Woodward & Armstrong, supra n. 138, at 315–346 (describing 
rewrites of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1975)).
140 Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11–12. 
141 See Joan Biskupic, Sandra Day O’Connor 106 (HarperCollins 2005) (“The truth was that 
Burger’s personal style inspired rivalries.”); Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12 (arguing that Burger’s 
“personal characteristics” exacerbated divisions on the Court); see e.g.Woodward & Armstrong, 
supra n. 138, at 269, 359–360 (describing instances that illustrate Burger’s sometimes difficult 
leadership style).  
142 Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 59, at 327–328. 
143 Biskupic, supra n. 141, at 106; Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 59, at 356; Woodward & 
Armstrong, supra n. 138, at 100, 170–172, 258, 417–419. 
144 Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun 154–160, 185–188 (Times Books 2005); 
Tinsley E. Yarbrough,  Harry A. Blackmun: The Outsider Justice 275, 287–288 (Oxford U. Press 
2008). 
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apparently came in part from interviews with at least five of his colleagues, including many 
whom were ideologically closest to him.145
D. William H. Rehnquist 
Just five years after the end of an almost nineteen-year tenure, it is too early to assess 
fully the Rehnquist Chief Justiceship. Five of the eleven who served with him as associate 
Justices remain on the Court,146 important papers remain closed, and the fate of some strands of 
Rehnquist Court jurisprudence still hangs in the balance. Yet a few words are appropriate, not 
only because of the length of his service (the longest since Melville Fuller died a century ago), 
but because Chief Justice  Roberts served as his law clerk when Rehnquist was an associate 
Justice.147
Rehnquist surely had his impact, yet it is unclear that as Chief Justice he led the Court in 
crafting sustainable doctrine of the significance of that associated with Hughes and Warren. 
Moreover, the disposition of the major crisis on his watch—Bush v. Gore148—remains 
controversial and the extent of his leadership remains hidden. Accordingly, Henry Abraham’s 
145 David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 Const. Commentary 303, 304–
305 (2001) (identifying Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and probably White and Rehnquist as those 
interviewed); see also Leeds, supra n. 59 (reporting Brennan’s criticisms of Burger). 
146 S. Ct. of the U.S., About the Supreme Court, Members of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
147 S. Ct. of the U.S., About the Supreme Court, Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme 
Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (accessed Jan. 25, 2011).
148 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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conclusion that Rehnquist was “a great [C]hief [J]ustice,”149 seems generous and premature. Of 
the seven Justices who served with him just prior to, and who issued statements upon, his death, 
only Justice O’Connor used the word “great” in assessing his service.150
Nonetheless, Rehnquist appears to have successfully led the conference and left a mark as 
Chief Justice. If Rehnquist’s final group of colleagues generally did not label him “great,” the 
others all did use the words “fair” or “fairness” to describe him.151 Although Justice O’Connor 
said she liked Chief Justice Burger, she described Rehnquist as a “terrific” and “wonderful Chief 
Justice.”152 Rehnquist presided in a “humble fashion,” “put on no airs at all,” and “held no 
grudges”153—assessments that were not often used in connection with Burger and accordingly 
draw a contrast. She credited Rehnquist with preserving harmonious personal relations among 
Justices with divergent jurisprudential approaches.154 Kennedy described Rehnquist as someone 
149 Abraham, supra n. 1, at 277. 
150 S. Ct. of the U.S., Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death of Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist,  http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx? 
FileName=pr_09-04-05b.html (accessed Jan. 23, 2011).
151 Id.; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, in In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 Harv. L. 
Rev. 3, 4 (2005) (describing Rehnquist as “fair”); Linda Greenhouse, Court in Transition; 
William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80, N.Y.Times A16 (Sept. 5, 
2005) (reporting on earlier tribute praising Rehnquist’s impartiality in presiding). 
152 Sandra Day O’Connor, Response, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1673, 1674 (2006).
153 Id. 
154 O’Connor, supra n. 1, at 5; see also Savage, supra n. 133, at 362–363 (discussing the positive 
impact of Rehnquist’s interpersonal skills). 
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who stated his positions forcefully, but respected the “deliberative process,” and who was “a 
brilliant, effective, and dedicated Chief Justice.”155 Justices who often disagreed with Rehnquist 
on high-profile matters, such as Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Ginsburg, were among those 
who praised his performance as Chief Justice.156 That consensus signaled a professional respect 
for Rehnquist’s role as a task and social leader in marked contrast with their appraisals of his 
predecessor.  
Rehnquist did not see conference as an occasion to change minds, and accordingly, he 
conducted them efficiently without opportunity for extended discussion. Rehnquist also deployed 
opinion writing assignments to achieve strategic objectives. Although Rehnquist initially would 
seek to distribute them equally each term, he would minimize assignments during the second half 
of a term to a Justice who was slow to circulate a majority or dissenting opinion or to vote in a 
case in which opinions had circulated.157 This practice, which was communicated to the other 
155 Anthony M. Kennedy, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor: An Expression of 
Appreciation, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1663, 1664, 1667 (2006). 
156 Robert J. Giuffra, A Tribute to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1675, 
1676 (2006); see also O’Brein, supra n. 44, at 200–201 (stating that Brennan and Marshall 
praised Rehnquist as a “‘splendid’ [C]hief [J]ustice”); Savage, supra n. 133, at 14 (reporting 
praise of Rehnquist as Chief Justice from Brennan and Marshall); Blackmun Interview, supra n. 
136 (discussing Rehnquist’s fair assignment of cases); Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great? The 
Atlantic (Apr. 2005) (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/ 
rehnquist-the-great/3820/) (describing how even liberals may come to view the conservative 
Chief Justice as successful). 
157 O’Brien, supra n. 44, at 200–201. 
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Justices, promoted efficiency in part by giving Justices incentive to complete their writing and to 
act so the Court could issue opinions expeditiously.  
Just as Stone’s appreciation of Hughes signaled some of his own values, it is possible that 
what Chief Justice Roberts wrote of his predecessor may provide clues regarding his 
performance. Roberts admired Rehnquist’s intellectual curiosity, his lack of pretense, his direct 
manner, and his sense of whimsy, and Roberts described him as “a genuinely kind, thoughtful, 
and decent man.”158 Years before his Court experienced a presidential rebuke at the State of the 
Union,159 Roberts spoke admiringly of Rehnquist’s decision to skip one such occasion when it 
conflicted with his painting class.160 Roberts called his former boss “a towering figure in 
American law” and, more pertinent to this piece, “one of a handful of great Chief Justices.”161
II. The Impact of Context  
Success as Chief Justice, as in other leadership positions, depends on context as well as 
skill. Some background conditions remain relatively constant. For instance, the position of Chief 
Justice confers little hierarchical advantage. Unlike the President’s Cabinet, the Court adheres to 
“one person, one vote,” having done so long before the Court recognized that formula as a 
constitutional principle.162 The Chief cannot remove other Justices and, except for the Taft 
158 John G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2005). 
159 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. Times A12 
(Jan. 29, 2010).
160 Roberts, supra n. 158, at 2.
161 Id.
162 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (stating that “one person, one vote” is a concept 
that has existed since the Declaration of Independence).
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anomaly of a Chief Justice who had, as President, appointed some of his colleagues, cannot 
expect loyalty from grateful associates who owe their positions to him. 
Yet the context also presents variable elements that shape the historic possibilities of a 
Chief Justice. Chief Justices have presided under varying circumstances that presented different 
opportunities and constraints. Although history furnishes no mechanism to test counterfactuals, 
circumstance surely creates leadership opportunities and impacts outcomes and accordingly 
history’s assessments. Important contextual factors include Court composition as well as the 
issues that the times present. 
A. The Composition of the Court 
The makeup of the Court affects the context in which a Chief Justice operates. 
Composition may impact a Chief Justice’s fortunes in at least three ways. 
1. Ideological Balance 
Chief Justices need to operate differently depending on the ideological balance on the 
Court and where they fall on the relevant spectrum relative to their colleagues. Some successful 
Chiefs have been centrists in the context of their Court. Taft, for instance, occupied a center 
position along with Sanford and McKenna.163 Hughes’ influence too, was enhanced by his 
ideological position on the Court. He and Roberts occupied the middle of a Court that often164
divided between Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter to the right and Holmes (or 
163 Ross, supra n. 29, at 20. 
164 From 1930 to 1936, the Court was, however, unanimous eighty-five percent of the time. 
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Court That Challenged the New Deal (1930-1936), 24 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 65, 98 (1984). 
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Cardozo), Brandeis, and Stone on the left.165 When Hughes and Roberts reached the same 
resolution, and sometimes when they did not, Hughes was able to dictate the outcome of many 
cases.166 Roberts was closest to Hughes personally and ideologically and that double proximity 
enhanced Hughes’ clout.  
A Chief who occupies the center position is in a strong position to lead. His vote can 
decide many cases, thereby expanding his bargaining strength. His colleagues have additional 
reason to curry his favor. Not only can he reward them through the assignment power, he also 
can help those with strong predilections see their preferred outcomes prevail and perhaps see 
their views shape doctrine. 
Whereas Taft and Hughes gained influence from their position at or near the Court’s 
center, Warren ultimately emerged as the leader of the Court’s liberal wing. In that position, he 
operated at different times in at least three distinct contexts. During the early years of his Chief 
Justiceship, he sometimes found himself as part of a minority faction, often with Black and 
Douglas. Following the appointment of Brennan in 1956,167 the so-called liberal wing grew to 
include four reliable Justices.168 This development enhanced Warren’s position, not only by 
bringing him within a single vote of a majority in many cases, but also by adding Brennan’s 
strategic skills to his coalition.169 This circumstance lent greater significance to Warren’s 
165 Id. at 89.
166 Id.
167 S. Ct. of the U.S., supra n. 146.




interpersonal skills, and he was often able to persuade Clark to join them.170 Once Arthur 
Goldberg replaced Frankfurter in 1962, Warren was the leader of a generally reliable liberal 
majority, which allowed him to achieve results consistent with his philosophy.171
Like Warren, Rehnquist was the leader of an ideological faction, yet his Chief Justiceship 
reveals a fourth position that can provide leadership opportunity. After Justice Clarence Thomas 
joined the Court in 1992, Rehnquist found himself essentially in the center of a five-Justice 
conservative block consisting of himself and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 
Although Rehnquist could not keep this group together on some issues of importance to him, like 
abortion or school prayer, he was able to achieve narrow majorities in a number of federalism 
cases.172 Rehnquist often wrote the majority opinion in the first case in an area in order to 
produce an opinion that all five would join before distributing the pen to others.  
And yet simply being part of the Court’s majority has not always been a measure of 
success for a Chief Justice. In important cases, Vinson frequently was part of a majority 
consisting of himself, Reed, the three other Truman appointees (Burton, Clark, and Minton), and 
170 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 208. 
171 The Warren Court liberals consisted of Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Goldberg or Fortas, 
and Marshall once he replaced Clark in 1967, although Black proved less reliable in later years. 
See e.g. Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective 7–10 (U. Press 
of Va. 1993) (illustrating how the appointments of White and Goldberg made a difference in 
specific cases). 
172 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 569, 575 (2003) (explaining that Rehnquist was able to fashion 
majorities in some federalism cases but not in those dealing with certain social issues). 
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often Jackson.173 Nonetheless, Vinson is not generally credited with having constructed the 
coalition nor is the resulting jurisprudence as a whole remembered as historic.174 Burger sided 
with the majority in many of the most significant cases during his tenure, yet was not viewed as 
their architect. 
2. Complementary Allies 
The success of a Chief Justice may depend, in part, on the presence of dependable allies 
who possess talents that complement and supplement his or her own. Taft, for instance, was not a 
great technical lawyer but was able to rely on Van Devanter to provide that form of professional 
leadership for the Court.175 Warren benefited from the presence of Brennan, a master strategist 
who was able to persuade colleagues to adopt his position and to craft opinions in a manner that 
would attract five votes.176
It is not enough simply to have friends—Stanley Reed had managed Vinson’s 
congressional campaigns,177 and Tom Clark was Vinson’s colleague in Truman’s Cabinet.178
173 Frank, supra n. 131, at 243.
174 See generally id. at 242–244 (noting that it is not clear whether Vinson was a leader to his 
colleagues, and explaining that he was not as effective in the Chief Justice position as he had 
been in others). 
175 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 897 (quoting Taft, who described Van Devanter as his “lord 
chancellor”). 
176 David O. Stewart, The Great Persuader, 76 ABA J. 58, 58 (1990). 
177 Urofsky, supra n. 41, at 18. 
178  Abraham, supra note 1, at 190-192.
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Vinson and Clark often voted together179 yet their friendship did not enable Vinson to succeed as 
Chief Justice.180 What adds particular value are allies who bring needed qualities to the table. 
Moreover, a Chief Justice can only exploit the resources the Court’s personnel provides if 
he or she fairly assesses his or her own limitations and needs, and forms alliances with those who 
can help him or her. Taft was willing to use Van Devanter or even Brandeis to provide the 
technical help his Court needed.181 Warren certainly benefitted from Brennan’s talents, yet it was 
to Warren’s credit that he recognized areas in which he could use help and was willing to seek it 
from Brennan.182 By contrast, Burger’s apparently inflated self-assessment may have 
undermined his ability to lead.183
3. The Dispositions around the Table 
 The mix of personalities around the table also affects a Chief’s ability to lead. The tasks 
of Stone and Vinson were surely complicated by the presence of Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
and Jackson on the Court. They were strong-willed individuals who approached many legal 
issues quite differently once the questions relating to federal legislative power and economic 
substantive due process were resolved in the late Hughes years. All were highly intelligent, 
energetic, and not averse to giving voice, written and oral, to their convictions. Their propensity 
to concur and dissent, sometimes at length, consumed time that might have been spent producing 
179 Frank, supra n. 131, at 245 tbl. 4. 
180 Urofsky, supra n. 41, at 18, 155. 
181 Steamer, supra n. 1, at 176.
182 See Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 205–206 (discussing the relationship between Warren and 
Brennan).
183 Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12.
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majority opinions. Moreover, Frankfurter and Douglas were capable of real nastiness, which 
introduced an acrimonious tenor to Court deliberations.184 The Court was increasingly divided, 
and often the opinions reflected the personal tensions.185
 Of course, Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas also served under Hughes (and Warren) 
without being as disruptive, individually and collectively, as they were under Stone and Vinson.  
No doubt that reflected Hughes’s (and Warren’s) interpersonal skill. Hughes, after all, was able 
to manage a Court with McReynolds and Butler, neither of whom presented easy personalities. 
Yet Hughes also benefited from the fact that Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas served their first 
years on his Court at a time when they were still finding their way and had not divided 
ideologically or personally. Additionally, they may have showed someone of Hughes’s rare 
stature a degree of deference they did not accord Stone, with whom they had served as a fellow 
Associate Justice.  
  Warren won the affection of his colleagues with the exception of Frankfurter, who 
clearly irritated him.186  Although Jackson’s death in 1954 cost the Court a gifted Justice,187
Bernard Schwartz suggests that Jackson’s death may have eased Warren’s task, since Black and 
184 Urofsky, supra n. 41, at 35–36.
185 Id. at 39–40, 42–43, 137, 149. 
186 See Anthony Lewis, Warren Says Frankfurter Degrades Court in Dissent, N.Y. Times (Apr. 
25, 1961) (reporting Warren’s response in Court to Frankfurter’s statement); see also Schwartz, 
supra n. 55, at 253–257, 261–264, 286 (providing examples of the animosity  between Warren 
and Frankfurter). 
187 Abraham, supra note 1, at 205.
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Jackson were personally antagonistic to one another.188 Frankfurter, of course, remained to stir 
the pot, but he also alienated many of his colleagues by the condescending manner in which he 
approached them. A more politic adversary may have complicated Warren’s leadership task 
during the first part of his service. And Frankfurter’s retirement in 1962 made the Court more 
harmonious during the last half of Warren’s service. 
Warren also may have been fortunate that the Court he joined included a number of 
former politicians. Black, Burton, and Minton were former senators;189 Jackson and Clark had 
been Attorney General.190 They no doubt had a fair measure of professional respect for Warren. 
Moreover, these men were sensitive to political considerations and, in many respects, were 
receptive to Warren’s approach to constitutional issues. Some who later joined the Court, like 
Brennan, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Fortas, were also pretty pragmatic people.  
This discussion of Warren’s colleagues suggests another generalization. A Chief Justice’s 
influence also turns on how amenable his or her colleagues are to being persuaded. Warren 
served with a number of people who were more practical than ideological. They may have been 
susceptible to Warren’s reason or charm in a way that a rival ideologue would not have been. 
 Taft and Hughes served among colleagues predisposed in their favor. Taft had appointed 
Van Devanter, with whom he served for sixteen years and played a considerable role in securing 
188 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 36. 
189 See Abraham, supra n. 1 at 167, 189, 195. 
190 .Id. at 184, 192.
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an associate justiceship for Pierce Butler.191 Taft almost always served with five or six other 
conservative Justices and accordingly was in a position to lead the Court in a direction with 
which he sympathized.192
Although Hughes experienced a somewhat rocky confirmation battle in the Senate, he 
joined a Court that was glad to have him. Paul Freund pointed out that one attitude that Holmes 
and Brandeis shared with Van Devanter and McReynolds was their pleasure in Hughes’ 
appointment,193 a sentiment widely shared on the Hughes Court. 
 Other circumstances also gave Taft and Hughes some advantages in achieving a 
consensus that Vinson and Stone lacked. Brandeis may have been a great dissenter but he felt a 
strong institutional loyalty to the Court. As such, Brandeis looked for opportunities to work with 
Taft, and on a number of cases, their common efforts helped achieve Taft’s ambition to mass the 
Court. Van Devanter had trouble writing,194 McReynolds was lazy,195 and Holmes was slipping 
191 Taft also briefly overlapped with his appointee, Mahlon Pitney. S. Ct. of the U.S., Members of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx 
(accessed Jan. 19, 2011). 
192 From 1923 until 1925, in addition to Taft, the Court included: Joseph McKenna, Van 
Devanter, McReynolds, George Sutherland, Butler, and Edward Sanford. Id. When McKenna 
retired in 1925, the more moderate Harlan Fiske Stone took his place. Id.
193 Freund, supra n. 27, at 8.
194 Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court 
and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891, 1944 n. 267 (1994).
195 .Mason, supra note 5, at 195, 215-217 (describing McReynolds’s aversion to work among his 
deficiencies).
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during Hughes’ service,196 all of which may have reduced their propensity to dissent. 
Conversely, Stone and Vinson had Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson in their primes, a 
collection that made unity more elusive. 
B. What Arises on a Chief’s Watch 
 What matters arise during the term of a Chief Justice will also affect his opportunity to 
lead in a manner that history recalls. Hughes led the Court through the crisis the Court faced 
when the constitutional jurisprudence of the first third of the twentieth century collided with the 
politics of the New Deal.197 The Court was no doubt fortunate that Hughes was its leader when 
President Franklin Roosevelt proposed his “Court-packing plan,”198 but that crisis also 
contributed to Hughes’ place in history by furnishing a stage on which he could star. Hughes 
drafted a “masterful letter” to Senator Burton Wheeler that refuted Roosevelt’s arguments in 
convincing fashion199 and generally outmaneuvered Roosevelt. 
Dwight Eisenhower did not put Warren on the Court to handle the assault on “separate 
but equal,” but that work, from Brown in 1954 to Loving in 1967, essentially framed Warren’s 
196 Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice:The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes371-375 Little 
Brown and Company 1989) (referring to Holmes’s deterioration during his brief service on 
Hughes Court).
197 See generally Cushman, supra note 41. 
198 See Steamer, supra n. 1, at 23 (explaining that Franklin Roosevelt planned to add six more 
Justices to the Supreme Court to make a total of fifteen Justices).
199 Id.; Freund, supra n. 27, at 27–30 (citing the profound impact of Hughes’ letter in defeating 
the Court-packing plan).  See also McElwain, supra note 25, at 5 (discussing impact of Hughes’s 
statesmanlike handling  of Court-packing crisis on Hughes’s historical standing). 
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service. Warren’s leadership in that area was certainly not all history recalls of his tenure, which 
included major doctrinal shifts regarding criminal procedure,200 reapportionment,201 and 
privacy,202 among other areas. But it, along with these other areas, formed a coherent record of 
judicial leadership that history has largely viewed in a positive manner.  
That Brown arose at the beginning of Warren’s tenure was fortuitous in terms of his 
professional standing. The unanimous opinion in Brown was rightfully seen as among Warren’s 
great contributions. It established his credentials in a way that provided an early infusion of 
capital in his account, with history and with his colleagues.  
The timing of Brown illustrates another important point. When matters arise may affect a 
Chief’s legacy. Warren may have been fortunate that Brown arose at the very outset of his term 
200 See, e.g.,Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing rules to establish voluntary 
waiver of right against self-incrimination in custodial interrogations); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendant in criminal case had right to appointed 
counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(holding that evidence seized in violation of Fourth 
Amendment to Constitution should be inadmissible in state court prosecution.
201 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that state legislative districts in both 
houses of state legislature had to be roughly equal in population); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 
1 (1964) (holding that Congressional districts must be roughly equal in population); Baker v. 
Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that legislative malapportionment presented a justiciable 
question).  
202 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that constitutional right to 
privacy orevented state from prohibiting use of contraceptives by married couple). 
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when leaders of the Court’s competing wings were vying for his favor and accordingly may have 
been more receptive to his leadership. 
Yet the accidents of timing should not be overestimated in accounting for Hughes’s and 
Warren’s success. The appearance of great cases did not propel Stone203 or Burger204 to 
successful stints as Chief Justice. Yes, the reputations of Hughes and Warren benefitted from the 
circumstances they were dealt, yet their presence and leadership also shaped American history 
and the position of the Court. 
III  Different Models 
These sketches of recent Chief Justices caution against associating success in that 
position with tangible factors in any formulaic way.  The differences among the very successful 
203 Stone’s first terms included the Court’s path-blazing Commerce Clause decisions in United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–126 (1941) (holding that Congress had power to regulate 
labor conditions under the Commerce Clause for workers producing goods intended for interstate 
commerce) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (holding that Congress could use 
its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate productive activities intended simply 
for producers own consumption).
204 Burger fumbled leadership opportunities in early cases dealing with school desegregation like 
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 1218 (1969) and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); and with presidential power, like in New 
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974),in part because his preferred disposition was at odds with that of the majority.   See Stern 
and Wermiel, supra note 59, at 332-334, 355-358, 379-382.  
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Chief Justices far exceeded their similarities, and the qualities found in some successful Chief 
Justices also appeared in some who fared less well. 
 For instance, extraordinary legal skill and experience help, but do not guarantee success, 
as Chief Justice. Hughes was a great lawyer who had extensive experience at the upper echelons 
of his profession.205 Yet the same might be said about Stone, who was Attorney General and a 
highly regarded Associate Justice. Warren, by contrast, had relatively modest experience as a 
lawyer.206 Yet Hughes and Warren succeeded whereas Stone did not.  
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had served on the Court prior to being named its Chief. 
They were familiar with the Court and its operations. Their conduct as Chief Justice in part 
represented a reaction to that of the Chief Justice under whom each had served.207 Conversely, 
Warren was a neophyte regarding the Court. But for Vinson’s unexpected death, he was destined 
205 See Ross, supra n. 29, at 10 (stating that Hughes’ persuasive gifts were such that Cardozo, 
when on the New York Court of Appeals, would defer ruling for twenty-four hours on any case 
Hughes had argued to “resist Hughes’[ ] magnetism”). 
206 Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Earl Warren: Super Chief in Action, 33 Tulsa L.J. 477, 481 
(1997).
207 Lash, supra n. 121, at 313–315 (explaining that Hughes believed White was frequently 
unprepared for the Conference and thus learned from White’s mistakes); Ross, supra n. 29, at 
220–221 (reporting that Hughes thought White failed to structure or limit conference discussion); 
Mason, supra note 117, at 787-792 (contrasting Stone’s leadership style with that of Hughes);cf. 
Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great? Atlantic Monthly, April 2005, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/rehnquist-the-great/3820/(accessed March 
14, 2011) (discussing Burger and Rehnquist styles of leadership). 
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to become Solicitor General to prepare him for a later move to the Court.208 When he arrived at 
the Court much earlier than expected, he needed to spend time understanding the basic roles of 
Court employees and observing a few conferences before he took the helm. 
Nor does prior judicial experience correlate with success as Chief Justice. Seven of the 
eight Chief Justices since Taft had prior judicial experience. Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had 
served on the Court; Taft, Vinson, Burger, and John Roberts had been appellate court judges. 
Warren had not. The novice Warren succeeded as did some, but not all, of the seasoned jurists. 
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist were gifted intellects. Warren was not,209 although as 
Justice Stewart pointed out, to his credit he did not pretend to be one.210
Nor does prior relationship with others on the Court guarantee success as Chief Justice. 
Taft, Hughes, and Rehnquist came to the Court with strong relations with most of its members 
and these prior relationships no doubt aided them. The same advantage did not confer success on 
Stone or Vinson, each of whom was well-acquainted with most of their colleagues. And 
Warren’s lack of a prior relationship with his colleagues211 did not inhibit his success as their 
leader. 
208 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 3.
209 See Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren, the “Warren Court,” and the Warren Myths, 67 U. 
Mich. L. Rev. 353, 354 (1968) (“Unlike Stone and Charles Evans Hughes before him, Warren 
can hardly be regarded as the intellectual or forensic superior of any of his brethren.”) 
210 Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 31. 
211 See Warren, supra n. 76, at 276 (reporting that he knew only Clark well, and Jackson and 
Douglas slightly). 
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Even running conference does not need to follow one method. Hughes and Rehnquist 
apparently operated most efficiently whereas Stone, Vinson, and Burger were less structured. 
Yet Warren apparently allowed substantial discussion without loss of control.212
Nor does success depend upon occupying a particular place in the ideological spectrum. 
Taft and Hughes were centrists on their Courts but Vinson probably was, too. Warren and 
Rehnquist successfully led factions at opposite wings of their Courts, but Stone also had been a 
somewhat ideological jurist, yet was unsuccessful as Chief Justice. 
Finally, the secret of success does not reside in the manner of seeking to establish Court 
majorities. Hughes avoided discussions of cases outside of conference unless initiated by one of 
his colleagues. Warren, however, frequently engaged in one-on-one and small-group discussions 
to good effect. His “persuasive powers” helped entice Reed and perhaps others to make the 
majority opinion in Brown unanimous.213 Yet whereas Warren’s efforts enhanced his leadership, 
Burger apparently more often offended his colleagues through these efforts. 
Notwithstanding the absence of one precise mold from which the successful Chief 
Justices are cut, less tangible attributes do seem to be associated with successful Chief Justices. 
First, success requires that a Chief Justice discharge functions with professional skill. Taft, 
Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist, in different ways, met this challenge. All worked hard, came to 
conference well-prepared, and distributed work strategically, yet fairly. Those who have been 
212 Id. at 282–283. 
213 Tushnet, supra n. 171, at 4; see also Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 90, 94 (describing Warren’s 
sessions with Reed on Brown); Leeds, supra n. 59 (explaining, from Justice Brennan’s point of 
view, how Chief Justice Warren was effective at persuading other Justices to vote a particular 
way). 
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less successful were deficient in one or more of those respects. Stone was not a leader; Vinson 
was lazy; Burger was mediocre. 
Second, interpersonal skills matter. Taft, Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist were successful 
social leaders who conducted their relations with the other justices in a collegial fashion. 
Disagreement did not make them disagreeable. A Chief Justice’s charm cannot eliminate all 
strife214 but  social skills can mitigate tension and promote collegiality. Stone and Burger were 
less skilled in dealing with others. They could not draw from personal capital with their 
associates, and the atmosphere surrounding their Courts deteriorated. 
Third, those who were most successful understood both the limits and possibilities of 
their role as Chief Justice, taking account of the powers their position conferred and the context 
in which they operated. Taft, Hughes, and Warren understood pretty quickly that their power 
came from their ability to persuade, and they acted to maximize their ability to do so. A 
successful government bureaucrat like Vinson or law school dean like Stone may find that being 
Chief Justice does not confer the accustomed benefits a hierarchical structure affords other 
leaders.  
Moreover, those who succeeded managed to pursue achievable goals through appropriate 
strategies. Warren could operate differently after Brennan joined the Court than before;215
Goldberg’s arrival changed the equation further.216 Warren adapted to changing circumstances. 
214 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 898–900 (discussing conflicts on the Court notwithstanding Taft’s 
social talents). 
215 See Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 205–206 (discussing the close relationship between Warren and 
Brennan).
216 See id. at 446 (explaining how Goldberg became one of Warren’s strongest supporters).
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Stone, by contrast, apparently failed to appreciate the peril to his position as Court leader of 
debating the points each colleague made.  
Fourth, the successful Chief Justices demonstrated awareness about themselves and the 
context in which they functioned. Taft and Warren understood that they lacked some technical 
skills but borrowed them from Van Devanter and Brennan respectively. Conversely, Burger’s 
pretentious behavior  alienated some of his colleagues.217
Fifth, it helps if the Chief Justice really enjoys shouldering the extra burdens that position 
imposes. Clearly, Taft, Hughes, and Warren relished being Chief Justice, and that attitude 
probably contributed to their success. Stone’s views were ambivalent at best. He once likened 
being Chief Justice to being a law school dean, a position he had also held, since both have “to 
do the things that the janitor will not do.”218 The administrative demands weighed on him, and he 
viewed them as a distraction from judging, the activity he most enjoyed.219 Burger gravitated to 
his administrative and ceremonial roles regarding the judiciary and legal profession and 
contributed in these respects, but one wonders whether his preoccupation with those parts of the 
job came at the expense of judging and working with his colleagues. 
The common ingredient of those who found success as Chief Justice was the ability to 
lead given the opportunities and confines of the position. Leadership, Robert Steamer observed, 
“is intrinsic.”220 It requires professional and interpersonal skill, energy, awareness—and 
something more. 
217 Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12.
218 Steamer, supra n. 1, at 18. 
219 Mason, supra n. 117, at 581, 606, 639–640, 787–788. 
220 Steamer, supra n. 1, at 31–32. 
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Hughes, Warren, and Taft all brought unique stature to the Court based on their imposing 
resumes. Hughes’s experience included service as Governor of New York, Associate Justice, 
Republican presidential candidate in 1916, and Secretary of State.221 Warren had been a highly 
successful Governor of California and Republican vice-presidential candidate;222 Taft, an 
appellate court judge, Secretary of War, and President.223
Yet their stature rested on more than the credits on their resumes. Hughes, Paul Freund 
observed, exuded a “Jovian figure.”224 One suspects his presence inspired a difficult bunch. 
“Everybody was better because of Toscanini Hughes, the leader of the orchestra,” Frankfurter 
wrote, “[o]ne man is able to bring things out of you that are there, if they’re evoked, if they’re 
sufficiently stimulated, sufficiently directed. Chief Justice Hughes had that very great quality.”225
Hughes’ professional reputation and public standing also enhanced the Court’s stature. 
Jackson credited Hughes’s presence as helping the Court weather the storm during the 1930s 
when it abandoned some recent and long-standing precedents.226 Hughes was “a symbol of 
stability as well as of progress” whose presence “gave the country a sense of steadiness.”227
221 See, e.g., Pusey, supra n. 25, at 181-190, 271-281, 315-359, 411-425.
222 See,e.g., Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1.
223 See, e.g., Mason, supra note 5, at 20-21,24-33,
224 Freund, supra n. 27, at 13. 
225 Frankfurter, supra n. 6, at 902. 
226 Robert H. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 27 ABA J. 
408, 408 (July 1941).
227 Id. at 408–409. 
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Warren brought some of these same qualities. “The most important feature of Earl 
Warren’s [C]hief [J]usticeship,” legal historian Ted White wrote, “was his presence. . . . He was 
regarded as one of the great Chief Justices in American history because of the intangible but 
undeniable impact of his presence on the Court.”228
Ultimately, the greatest Chief Justices are measured not simply by their ability to lead, 
but by the direction and distance they took the Court and constitutional law. Hughes 
outmaneuvered Roosevelt on the court-packing plan and led the Court in doctrinal directions that 
accommodated the New Deal. Warren led the Court through doctrinal revolutions regarding civil 
rights, criminal procedure, and legislative apportionment. As John Hart Ely wrote of Warren, 
“[h]e was a leader because he was a man with a mission, and because the mission was good.”229
IV. Speculating on Chief Justice Roberts 
Although it is premature to assess John Roberts’ influence as Chief Justice, the preceding 
discussion offers some measures to inform speculation on that score. Roberts certainly brings 
imposing assets to his position. He came to the Court after a highly successful career as a 
Supreme Court advocate;230 he is perhaps the ablest lawyer to serve as Chief Justice since 
Hughes. He clearly is very bright and energetic, well-versed in the work of the Court, and 
228 White, supra n. 63, at 161. 
229 John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 11, 11 (1974). 
230 See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from 
Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1149, 1228–1230 (2010) (describing 
Roberts’ success as Supreme Court advocate); Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, The Atlantic 
(Jan.–Feb. 2007) (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/roberts-
apos-s-rules/5559/) (describing Roberts’ success as advocate).
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curious about it. His professional record leaves no doubt regarding his abilities to read and 
master an appellate record and the relevant cases, to frame issues in a compelling manner, to 
distinguish cases, to anticipate consequences of doctrinal choices, and to respond to arguments. 
Roberts’ formidable talent and success as an appellate advocate makes him well-suited to lead 
the Court in its tasks. 
Roberts also gives every appearance of possessing strong interpersonal skills. He has a 
reputation for working well with people who have differing viewpoints.231 As O’Connor wrote, 
“[f]ew have made the transition as seamlessly and effectively as Roberts. He knew our traditions 
well, as he had clerked in 1980 for then Associate Justice Rehnquist. His sense of humor and 
articulate nature and calm demeanor combine to make him a very effective Chief.”232 Roberts 
does not bring the stature of a Taft, Hughes, or Warren. Yet neither did Rehnquist, who 
nonetheless served successfully as Chief Justice.  
Some of Roberts’ actions suggest that institutional concerns may guide his conduct to a 
greater degree than that of most of his colleagues. During the last five years, he has voted with 
the majority more often than virtually all of the other Justices. As shown below,233 in three of his 
five terms on the Court, he voted in the majority as or more often than any other member of the 
231 Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, The New Yorker (May 25, 2009) (available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin).
232 Sandra Day O’Connor, John Roberts, Time Magazine (Apr. 30, 2006) (available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1187207,00.html#ixzz19cWN2SGn). 
233 Data in these tables is taken from the annual StatPack releases at SCOTUSblog. Tom 
Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Stat Pack, http://www.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (accessed 
Jan. 19, 2011). 
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Court. Of course, other explanations may account for this tendency. It could reflect Roberts’ 
influence in shaping majorities or suggest that he is the Court’s pivot point. Yet it seems more 
plausible to believe that Roberts may sometimes join an apparent majority either to control the 
opinion assignment or to foster institutional solidarity or both, since the former may be simply a 
means to achieve the latter. 
ROBERTS’ MAJORITY OPINIONS 
OT05  OT06   OT07  OT08  OT 09 
Rank  1  2  1  3(tie)  1(tie)  
Percentage 93  88.4  89.7  81  91 
 Not only does Roberts rarely dissent, but he writes fewer dissenting opinions than does 
virtually any other Justice. In part, the paucity of his dissenting opinions may relate to the 
frequency with which he is in the majority. Yet Roberts also seems to write fewer dissents than 
most of the other Justices with high majority scores. In fact, of those on the Court since Roberts 
became Chief Justice, only Kennedy has written fewer dissents.234 Roberts has never been the 
lone dissenter.235
234 Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Final Super StatPack OT09, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf (July 7, 2010). 
235 Id. Excluding newly-appointed Justice Kagan, Justice Sotomayor was the only other Justice 
not to have filed a lone dissent but she had only been on the Court for one term. Id. By 
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ROBERTS’ DISSENTING OPINIONS 
  OT05  OT06   OT07  OT08  OT 09 
Dissenting Opinions  3  3  4  5  3 
Rank    7-8 (tie) 8  7-9(tie) 7  9 
Range for Court  3-14  1-14  4-11  3-15  3-12 
 Finally, Roberts also writes relatively few concurring opinions. In part, his opinion 
assignment power may be a factor. He may be able to choose authors who write majority 
opinions in a manner that gives him little reason to supplement the Court’s written record. On the 
other hand, Roberts may restrain himself in order to promote institutional solidarity. 
ROBERTS’ CONCURRING OPINIONS 
  OT05  OT06   OT07  OT08  OT09 
Concurring Opinions  2  1  5  4  2 
Rank    7-8 (tie) 9  6  6-7 (tie) 9 
Range for Court  2-7  1-10  1-10  2-9  2-13 
 Roberts has received credit in some instances where observers have seen his hand in 
crafting relatively narrow holdings that commanded a Court consensus instead of broader but 
divided results.236 Such judgments must be offered tentatively since the absence of information 
comparison, Stevens and Thomas had filed ten lone dissents, Souter four, Ginsburg two, and 
Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito one each. Id.
236 See e.g. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (seven to two decision 
upholding, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a federal law authorizing civil commitment 
56 
about the Justices’ initial positions sometimes obscures whether Roberts forged a minimalist 
consensus “as an act of judicial statesmanship” or made a “strategic retreat.”237 His concurring 
opinion in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn.,238 in which he defended the majority’s 
opinion from the charge that it reflected judicial activism in reaching to decide an issue not 
necessarily before the Court and in not according proper respect to precedent, reflects concerns 
regarding the Court’s institutional standing although it might also be seen as an effort to plant 
seeds for later attacks on other doctrine. 
Yet Roberts clearly has not abandoned his convictions, and in some areas he has 
aggressively pursued jurisprudential goals.239 Quite clearly, he is not simply content to make the 
engines run smoothly; there are some directions in which he wishes to lead the Court. Other 
contributions to this symposium have explored the substantive decisions of the Roberts Court in 
greater depth, but a few snapshots may contribute to the evolving portrait of the work of its Chief 
Justice. 
of a federal prisoner); N.W. Austin Mun. Util. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516–2517 (2009) 
(eight to one decision resolving voting-rights case on technical rather than constitutional 
ground). 
237 Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts versus Roberts, The New Republic (Mar. 2, 2010) (available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/roberts-versus-roberts). 
238 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010).
239 Rosen, supra n. 237.
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 Although other Justices have drawn their share of high-profile controversial opinions,240
Roberts has certainly not avoided writing contested decisions241 nor has he always written them 
in a manner designed to minimize the disputed area. Perhaps the most glaring example occurred 
240 See e.g. McDonald v. Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Alito writing 5 to 4 opinion holding 
Second Amendment limits power of states to restrict gun possession); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
at 917 (Kennedy, writing a five to four opinion invalidating restrictions on corporate 
expenditures in political campaigns); D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Scalia writing a 
five to four opinion holding the Second Amendment confers an individual right to gun 
possession); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130–132, 168 (2007) (Kennedy writing a five to 
four opinion upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute banning partial-birth abortion 
despite absence of exception to protect health of woman). 
241 See e.g. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acctg. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164 (2010) 
(writing a five to four opinion holding law unconstitutionally infringed president’s power by 
giving executive power to officials beyond president’s control); D.A.’s Off. v. Osborne, 129 S. 
Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) (writing a five to four opinion denying defendant’s constitutional right to 
obtain state’s DNA evidence in postconviction proceeding); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 
695, 704 (2009) (writing a five to four opinion holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable 
when an unlawful search is due to isolated police negligence); Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491, 
532 (2008) (holding a treaty non-self-executing and holding that a presidential order transcended 
presidential power); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–410 (2007) (writing a five to four 
opinion upholding school officials who confiscated pro-drug banner against First Amendment 
claim). See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (writing dissent in a five to four 
decision striking down a regime for considering detainment of alien enemy combatants). 
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in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.242 Roberts assigned 
himself the opinion for the Court although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger243
must have signaled that any opinion Roberts wrote would probably only speak for four Justices 
on some points. Yet presumably Roberts thought himself best able to write an opinion that would 
command at least four votes in support of a rationale adverse to virtually any racial 
classifications . More surprising were the arguments he used to portray Brown as reflecting an 
anticlassificationist vision of the Equal Protection Clause and his insistence that the attorneys for 
the black school children shared that vision, an argument that depended on a selective citation of 
sources read out of their historical context.244
In a number of important cases, Roberts has been unable to craft an opinion that would 
commit five Justices to a common rationale.245 On the other hand, consensus may have been 
impossible due to the ideological commitments of some Justices. In that case, the plurality 
242 551 U.S. at 797–798.
243 539 U.S. 306, 343–344 (concluding that diversity was a compelling interest and endorsing 
Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke). 
244 Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 791, 797 (2008); Snyder, supra n. 230, at 1237. 
245 See e.g. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62–63 (2008) (upholding Kentucky’s lethal injection 
protocol with only Justices Kennedy and Alito joining in the opinion); Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. at 797–798 (finding diversity to be a compelling interest and allowing some consideration 
of race in student assignments); Fed. Election Commn. v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 503–
504 (2007) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas arguing for broader ruling overturning 
precedent and striking down statute).
59 
opinions may reflect the intractability of the challenge rather than any failure on Roberts’ part, 
and his willingness to undertake the assignment may be evidence of institutional commitment.  
In addition to the attributes sketched above, Roberts has at least two other advantages that 
could greatly enhance his prospects of becoming a great Chief Justice. First, he is an extremely 
effective and telegenic verbal communicator. His performance during his confirmation hearings 
was simply awesome and attracted widespread praise.246 Although twenty-two senators, all 
Democrats, voted against Roberts’ confirmation, he attracted far greater cross-party support, and 
accordingly far fewer negative votes, than any other recent nominee.247 Roberts won support 
246 See e.g. Michael Fletcher, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Justice, The Washington Post 
(Sept. 30, 2005) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html) (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ confirmation hearing 
was almost flawless). 
247 Roberts was confirmed seventy-eight to twenty-two on September 29, 2005. U.S. Sen., U.S. 
Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress - 1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/ 
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00245 (accessed Jan. 22, 
2011). Alito, by comparison, was confirmed fifty-eight to forty-two on January 31, 2006, only 
four months later by the same Senate. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress - 2nd
Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/ 
roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2&vote=00002 (accessed Jan. 22, 2011). Sonia 
Sotomayor was confirmed sixty-eight to thrity-one on August 6, 2009. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate 
Roll Call Votes 111th Congress - 1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/ 
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00262 (accessed Jan. 22, 
2011). Sotomayor’s nine Republican votes included four who had announced their retirement. Id. 
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from fifty-one percent of opposing party senators, a far better showing than other Supreme Court 
nominees in the last five years. Surely his evident talent and his ability to project a comforting 
judicial disposition persuaded many Democrats to support him, in part by making that a position 
their constituents would accept or embrace. 
CONFIRMATION HEARING VOTES RECEIVED 
   Opposing Party Votes  % of Opposing Party Votes Received 
Roberts  23    51%   
Alito   4      9% 
Sotomayor  9    22.5% 
Kagan   5    12.5% 
Roberts’ assets as a television performer coincide with technological change that may add 
value to those skills. Most of his predecessors served before the advent of C-Span gave the Court 
much prospect of substantial air time.248 To date, Roberts has maintained a relatively low 
profile.249 Nonetheless, in his public appearances and interviews, Roberts presents himself as a 
Elana Kagan was confirmed sixty-three to thirty-seven a year later, on August 5, 2010. U.S. Sen., 
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress – 2nd Session, http://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2&vote=00229 
(accessed Jan. 22, 2011).  
248 See Bruce Collins, C-Span’s Long and Winding Road to a Still Un-Ttelevised Supreme Court, 
106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 12, 12–13 (describing C-Span’s coverage of the Supreme 
Court and its members).
249 See e.g. Pew Research Ctr., The Databank, 8% - Chief Justice Thurgood Marshall?
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1056 (accessed Jan. 22, 2011) 
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likeable figure who communicates in an effective manner. Roberts’ skill as a public and visible 
communicator is an asset that can enhance his, and the Court’s, public stature and develop 
support for its jurisprudence.  
Second, Roberts is likely to serve as Chief Justice for a long, long time. Earl Warren was 
sixty-two years old when Eisenhower nominated him as Chief Justice. When Roberts reaches 
sixty-two, he will have served longer than Hughes did as Chief Justice. When Roberts reaches 
sixty-seven, Hughes’ age when appointed, he will have served longer than Warren did. If 
Roberts serves until the age at which Hughes (seventy-nine) or Burger (seventy-nine) retired or 
Rehnquist (eighty) died, he will have essentially served longer than any Chief Justice except 
Marshall.250
 Roberts will no doubt encounter unanticipated circumstances. His opportunities to 
persuade may be limited if the Court remains ideologically divided and, in such a context, his 
(reporting that twenty-eight percent could identify Roberts as Chief Justice, compared to forty-
three percent who correctly identified Rehnquist in November 1986). 
250 Roger Taney, the Chief Justice with the second-longest tenure, took office only days before 
his fifty-ninth birthday, served twenty-eight and a half years until he was eighty-seven. Abraham, 
supra note 1, at  Roberts would pass Taney in length of service in spring 2034, a few months 
past his seventy-ninth birthday. Fletcher, supra n. 246 (noting that Roberts was fifty when he 
became Chief Justice in 2005). Burger retired a few days after turning seventy-nine; Hughes did 
so less than three months after reaching that milestone. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 8, 10; Pusey, supra
n. 25, at 786–787. Warren retired three months after his seventy-eighth birthday; at that age, 
Roberts will be about a year short of Taney’s service. Schwartz, supra n. 55, at 7, 764.  
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chance to lead may depend on which side of the divide he is on and whether he has colleagues 
who are amenable to persuasion in high-profile cases. 
Yet his anticipated tenure provides Roberts with unique opportunities. Like Hughes, 
Warren, and Rehnquist, he is likely to experience several different Roberts Courts as different 
presidents replace senior colleagues, a process that has already begun. In all likelihood, he will 
serve with Court configurations which will provide a variety of leadership challenges and 
opportunities. The luxury of time allows Roberts to be patient in cases where he is not 
immediately able to achieve his jurisprudential goals. For a protracted period, Roberts will 
probably initiate and direct conference discussions, assign most Court opinions, and have the 
opportunity to foster an environment conducive to the sort of leadership a Chief Justice can 
provide. For many, he will become the face of one branch of American government, and his 
image may define the judiciary for a long time. 
V. Conclusion  
“A Chief Justice,” Philip Kurland wrote, “despite the public image, has little authority 
that is not shared by his colleagues on the Court, except that which inheres in his personal 
capacities.”251 Yet what “inheres in his personal capacities” channeled through the few formal 
powers attached to his office has allowed some Chief Justices to lead the Court whereas others 
have simply held the title.252 Speaking in 1928, Charles Evans Hughes commented that John 
Marshall’s “preeminence was due to the fact that he was John Marshall, not simply that he was 
Chief Justice; the combination of John Marshall and the Chief Justiceship has given us our most 
251 Kurland, supra n. 209, at 354.  
252 Id.
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illustrious judicial figure.”253 Being Charles Evans Hughes or Earl Warren may also furnish a 
head start. 
Although the formal powers of the Chief Justice are limited, the manner in which they are 
deployed will affect the way in which the Court operates and the manner in which history recalls 
the Chief Justice. Recent history provides no single prescription for success in the role. Each 
Chief Justice operates in a different context, which will shape  opportunities for leadership and 
the appropriate strategies. Ultimately, the success of a Chief Justice depends upon the manner in 
which he or she discharges his or her professional responsibilities and exercises interpersonal 
skill, and his or her capacity for leadership in the context presented.  
John Roberts may not be John Marshall or Charles Evans Hughes or Earl Warren. Who 
is? That does not mean he will not emerge as a very consequential Chief Justice. Whether he 
does will depend on his ability to marshal his professional and personal resources, to adapt to the 
context circumstances present, and to deploy his formidable assets in service of a mission that 
history recognizes as enhancing the rule of law.                                                                                                        
253 Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 58 (Columbia U. Press 1928). 
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LEADING THE COURT: STUDIES IN 
INFLUENCE AS CHIEF JUSTICE 
Joel K. Goldstein*
John G. Roberts, Jr. has now served more than five years as 
the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States. He has held 
that position longer than Harlan Fiske Stone did and for nearly 
twice as many days as John F. Kennedy was President. 
Although Chief Justice Roberts’ judicial opinions, and those 
of the Court, offer jurisprudence to analyze, it is too early to reach 
definitive judgments regarding his influence as Chief Justice or 
his success in that position. Roberts holds an office that, unique 
among high governmental positions, resists confident real-time 
assessment. 
The office of Chief Justice is cloaked in ambiguity and mys-
tery. Most of what the Chief does publicly either resembles the 
work of the Associate Justices (i.e., opinion writing), involves  
administration of the federal judiciary, or seems ceremonial. The 
Chief’s administrative work may contribute importantly to the 
functioning of the judiciary,1 yet these labors do not provide the 
 * © 2011, Joel K. Goldstein. All rights reserved. Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, 
Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to other participants at the Constitu-
tional Law Discussion Forum at the University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of 
Law on December 15–16, 2010, for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, to 
the sponsors of that event, and to Russell Weaver and Mark Killenbeck for the invitation 
to participate. Stacy Osmond and Margaret McDermott, Esq. provided research assistance. 
I alone am responsible for the views and shortcomings of this Article. 
1. For instance, William Howard Taft was instrumental in securing passage of the 
Judiciary Act of 1925, which made most of the Court’s docket discretionary. Robert J. 
Steamer, Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court 184–185 (U. S.C. Press 1986). 
See also Henry J. Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme 
Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II 238–239 (5th ed., Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 2008) (describing Warren Burger’s administrative achievements); Earl M. 
Maltz, The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969–1986, at 10–11 (U. S.C. Press 2000) 
(also describing the administrative achievements of Warren Burger); Sandra Day 
O’Connor, The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice 141–145 (Ran-
dom House 2003) (discussing the initial skepticism that greeted Burger’s administrative 
reforms); Steamer, supra n. 1 at 187–192 (discussing the administrative reforms of Chief 
Justice Burger); see generally Alan B. Morrison & D. Scott Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of 
the United States: More Than Just the Highest Ranking Judge, 1 Const. Commentary 57 
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usual measure for assessing his or her contributions. Instead, his-
tory typically evaluates Chief Justices based largely on their 
perceived impact on the Court’s institutional standing and on its 
decisions and opinions, particularly those regarding constitu-
tional interpretation. Yet measuring that influence is difficult. 
The formal powers of the Chief Justice regarding the Court’s 
work are few—presiding at conference and assigning opinions 
when in the majority—and the linkage between a Chief’s action 
and historic effect is often inscrutable. Most of the activities that 
may significantly and distinctively affect the Court’s work occur
behind closed doors, obscured from the view of all but a few  
observers. Those who witness it, primarily the other Justices, 
generally maintain a discrete silence, at least while the Chief pre-
sides, other than tossing occasional public praise his or her way.  
The necessary customs of a small, collegial judicial institution 
may mandate these characteristics of invisible interactions and 
contemporary confidentiality, but those habits postpone informed 
judgment by denying outside observers critical information. 
Though these attributes characterize the Supreme Court gener-
ally, the Roberts Court presents some additional impediments to 
assessment. It has experienced a high degree of turnover with 
four new members, including the Chief, in five years.2 That 
amount of transition in personnel imposes new challenges for 
many members, including the Chief. New members must become 
acclimated to the Court’s work, practices, and personalities; con-
tinuing Justices must familiarize themselves with colleagues who 
have different attitudes, experiences, and styles than their prede-
cessors. The new members include a new Chief Justice who many 
had previously experienced as an advocate or lower court judge. 
The retirements of Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, David Souter, 
and John Paul Stevens necessarily impacted the group dynamic 
by removing some powerful personalities from the institutional 
mix. Turnover also puts some members in new roles. Justice  
Anthony Kennedy now is senior to all but the Chief Justice and 
Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Stevens’ retirement means that 
(1994) (discussing the nonjudicial responsibilities of Chief Justice); Steamer, supra n. 1, at 
16 (arguing that Taft’s term saw the Chief Justice become the head of the judiciary rather 
than simply the presiding officer of the Court). 
2. S. Ct. of the U.S., Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www 
.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Apr. 12, 2011). 
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Justice Kennedy gets to assign the opinion when he joins the four 
‚liberal‛ Justices. These changes mark the Court as an institution 
currently in flux. Some time is needed before the Justices adjust 
to a changed context and before the component parts arrange 
themselves in discernible and predictable patterns. 
Moreover, Roberts’ youth when appointed—he was fifty—
raises the prospect that these first five years may be but a frag-
ment of a tenure that could rival in length Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s thirty-four-year run. Even if Roberts does not match 
that record, life tenure and the actuarial tables would predict that 
his service will substantially exceed the seventeen-year average of 
his three most recent predecessors. Thus, Roberts may still be in 
the early moments of his tenure, a possibility that carries two 
significant consequences that, taken together, present a historical 
dilemma. The likely longevity of his term may allow him to exert 
a relatively unique impact on the Court and on American law. 
Nonetheless, much information regarding his leadership may  
remain hidden for some time, until his colleagues are willing to 
speak frankly and until his papers and those of other Justices are 
made available for scholars to assess. The history of his Chief 
Justiceship is being made, yet the history of his leadership will 
not be heard,3 at least for a while. 
Even though circumstances will defer informed assessments 
of Roberts’ impact, the patterns of the recent past may provide 
some useful analytical tools to help anticipate the likelihood that 
Roberts will exert influence as Chief Justice and the ways he 
might do so. Although the Chief Justice has ‚scant inherent pow-
ers‛4 and some suggest his office carries ‚no more authority than 
other members of the [C]ourt,‛5 anecdotal evidence suggests that 
a Chief can make a substantial difference, in discrete cases and in 
3. Cf. Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
705 (2007) (Roberts himself wrote, ‚When it comes to using race to assign children to 
schools, history will be heard.‛).
4. Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice 192 (Simon & Schus-
ter 1965). 
5. Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 246 (Oxford U. Press 1993). See 
also Felix Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 Va. L. Rev. 883, 901 (1953) (stat-
ing that ‚[a]side from the power to assign the writing of opinions . . . a Chief Justice has no 
authority that any other member of the Court has[ no]t‛ and that the Court, was really ‚an 
institution in which every man is his own sovereign. The Chief Justice is primus inter 
pares.‛).
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the overall operation of the Court.6 Historically, informed gov-
ernmental observers have cared deeply who becomes Chief 
Justice, and their behavior provides some evidence that the office 
is consequential.7
Some consensus suggests that during the last century, there 
have been at least two great Chiefs—Charles Evans Hughes and 
Earl Warren8—although some would add a third, William Howard 
Taft, as ‚near great.‛9 At least three other Chief Justices—Harlan 
Fiske Stone, Fred Vinson, and Warren Burger— are regarded as 
rather unsuccessful measured by their leadership of the Court’s 
decisionmaking efforts.10
6. E.g. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 899–902.  
7. When Chief Justice Fuller died on July 4, 1910, several members of the Court 
wanted to succeed him and significant lobbying occurred before President Taft nominated 
Justice Edward White. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 133–134. When Chief Justice White died 
on May 19, 1921, Taft became Chief Justice. Id. at 135. This was after making clear that 
he would not accept appointment as an Associate Justice and after having previously  
declined such appointments. Mason, supra n. 4, at 17. When Chief Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone died on April 22, 1946, some Justices reportedly sent word to President Truman that 
they would resign if Justice Robert Jackson became Chief Justice. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., 
Black v. Jackson: A Study in Judicial Enmity, in The Unmaking of a Whig 3, 5–6 (Geo. U. 
Press 1990). When President Truman instead nominated Fred Vinson, Justice Jackson 
sent an unprecedented cable to two congressional committee chairs blasting Justice Hugo 
Black who he suspected of undermining his prospects for elevation. Id. at 45–46. Presi-
dents care, too. President Taft stewed over the appointment in 1910, as did President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941, and President Truman in 1946. President Lyndon B. John-
son so wanted to elevate his friend, Justice Abe Fortas, that he ignored warning signs that 
such an appointment would receive a hostile reception. And senators place great stock in 
who occupies the center chair. Republicans and Southern Democrats invested considerable 
energies in successfully filibustering Justice Fortas’ promotion even though it would not 
change the Court’s composition. When President Ronald Reagan nominated Justice 
William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice, Senate Democrats focused on contesting his nomi-
nation but essentially ignored that of then Judge Antonin Scalia who President Reagan 
had nominated for Justice Rehnquist’s seat even though Justice Rehnquist’s elevation 
would not change the composition of the Court, whereas Scalia’s confirmation would.
8. See Abraham, supra n. 1, at 5–7, 158, 203 (discussing previous evaluations of the 
greatness of a Chief Justice, and recognizing Hughes as ‚great‛ and Warren as ‚[C]hief 
[J]ustice par excellence‛); Steamer, supra n. 1, at 36 (identifying Hughes and Warren, 
along with John Marshall, as great Chief Justices); Abe Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The 
Enigma of Leadership, 84 Yale L.J. 405, 405–406 (1975) (describing Marshall and Hughes’ 
leadership as ‚outstanding‛ and stating that Warren should be included in that ‚special 
category‛).
9. See Abraham, supra n. 1, at 147 (arguing that Taft was not a great Chief Justice 
despite his administrative and technical leadership, but was considered ‚near great‛); 
Mason, supra n. 4, at 304 (observing that Taft was not commonly regarded as a great Chief 
Justice). Some would argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist was ‚great,‛ but it is too soon to 
reach that judgment. See infra pt. I(D) for a discussion of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
10. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11 (arguing that Burger was not a distinguished Chief Justice 
based on his role in jurisprudential leadership); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Chief Justice 
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The modest, some might say meager, formal powers of a Chief 
Justice may allow, but certainly do not guarantee, judicial leader-
ship.11 Whether a Chief leads, and leads well, depends on his or 
her capacity to exploit the opportunities the powers provide. This 
ability turns on his or her possession of intangible qualities, 
which are unevenly distributed among those who occupy the cen-
ter chair. Between his two stints on the Court (at a time when he 
presumably thought his chance to be Chief Justice had passed), 
Hughes wrote that the Chief’s ‚actual influence will depend upon 
the strength of his character and the demonstration of his ability 
in the intimate relations of the judges.‛12 Professor David Dan-
elski essentially echoed this conclusion in an important article a 
half century ago; he concluded that a Chief Justice’s ‚actual influ-
ence depends upon his esteem, ability, and personality and how 
he performs his various roles.‛13
This Hughes–Danelski assessment seems clearly correct. Yet 
the experiences of Chief Justices during the last century suggest 
two refinements. First, there is no one model of background or 
conduct that predicts greatness as a Chief Justice. The traits that 
seem to correlate well with success as Chief Justice are intangible 
qualities of leadership, not any characteristics that lend them-
selves to easy measurement. Second, the influence of a Chief 
Justice inevitably depends on contextual factors as well as on per-
sonal attributes. Whether a Chief Justice can lead, and how, 
depends on the opportunities history provides, and those vary 
from Chief to Chief and often during any one incumbency. 
Part I of this Article will outline the thesis of Danelski’s 1960 
article and apply it to the seven Chief Justices from Taft to Rehn-
quist. Relying on these sketches, Part II will discuss the impact of 
context on the Chief’s influence. Part III will suggest that tangi-
ble qualities and particular practices do not correlate well with 
of the United States: Primus Inter Pares, 17 J. Pub. L. 20, 20 (1968) (stating that Stone 
‚suffered from administrative ineptitude‛); see generally Abraham, supra n. 1, at 183–184, 
191, 239 (discussing Stone’s ‚less [than] satisfactory‛ role as Chief Justice, Vinson’s ‚lack 
of leadership,‛ and Burger’s ‚marginally successful attempts‛ to shift the judicial position).
11. David J. Danelski, The Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, in 
Walter F. Murphy et al., Courts, Judges & Politics: An Introduction to the Judicial Process
675, 676 (6th ed., McGraw-Hill 2006) (stating that the office of Chief Justice ‚does not 
guarantee leadership‛).
12. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundation, 
Methods and Achievements: An Interpretation 57 (Garden City Publg. Co. 1936). 
13. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 676. 
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success as Chief Justice. Part IV will apply some of these general-
izations to Roberts before Part V offers conclusions. 
I. THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE IN 
THE DECISIONAL PROCESS 
A. The Danelski Formulation 
Fifty years ago, David J. Danelski published a short study of 
the Chief Justice’s influence in the Court’s decisionmaking 
process based on his review of Court papers during the Taft, 
Hughes, and Stone Chief Justiceships. He identified task and  
social leadership as two distinct activities that contributed to the 
success and cohesion of the Court.14 The former role focused on 
the Court’s work to reach a decision whereas the latter empha-
sized the need of the members of the institution to remain 
sufficiently cohesive, socially, to accomplish its work. The Chief’s 
success in performing those roles is not assured but is contingent 
on his or her mix of skills as perceived by his or her colleagues, 
his or her ‚esteem, ability, and personality and how he [or she] 
performs his [or her] various roles.‛15
Danelski suggested that the Chief Justice, as the presiding 
officer at the conference, was in a favorable but not inevitable  
position to exert both ‚task and social leadership.‛16 The Chief 
Justice typically presented the cases to the conference, which  
Danelski regarded as ‚an important task function.‛17 Although 
Danelski did not spell out the advantages associated with case 
presentation, presumably that function allows the Chief to frame 
the issues, a prerogative that may effectively steer discussion in a 
particular direction. Moreover, the right to be the first to state a 
position affords the Chief the opportunity to suggest a resolution 
before anyone else has verbally committed. Thus, presumably, the 
order of speaking at conference gives the Chief persuading advan-
tages over those who get to weigh in only after others have 
already stated their views. Minds can and do change but most are 
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Finally, the assignment power that the Chief exercises when in 
the majority confers substantial opportunity to shape the doctrine 
that will emerge from the decision. 
Danelski pointed out that presiding at conference also posi-
tioned the Chief to exercise critical social functions. He was in 
position ‚to invite suggestions and opinions, seek compromises, 
and cut off debate [that] appears to be getting out of hand.‛18 His 
ability to engage his colleagues yet manage their interaction could 
contribute to the Court’s cohesion, or lack thereof.
Danelski also explored the importance of the opinion-
assigning role, which falls to the Chief when he or she is part of 
the majority. That function presented four instrumental chal-
lenges: producing a valuable precedent, winning public 
acceptance for a decision, preserving a majority when the Court 
was divided, and massing the Court. 
Finally, Danelski concluded that unifying the Court was 
among the Chief’s ‚most important roles.‛19 Quite clearly, the 
Chief’s skill as a task and social leader and in assigning opinions 
would contribute to his or her success in this role. So, too, would 
the extent to which he or she emphasized unanimity as a judicial 
norm. 
B. Successful Chief Justices 
1. Charles Evans Hughes 
Hughes’ great success as Chief Justice related in part to his 
ability to merge the roles of task and social leader. Danelski pro-
claimed Hughes ‚the most esteemed member of his Court‛ in 
large part due to his commanding performance at conference.20
Hughes’ work won the respect of his colleagues. ‚Few men have 
been so fitted by talent and disposition to carry the heavy burden 
which unavoidably rests on the Chief Justice,‛ wrote Stone.21 ‚He 
18. Id.
19. Id. at 681. 
20. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 677. 
21. Harlan F. Stone, The Chief Justice, 27 ABA J. 407, 407 (July 1941). 
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was master of the business,‛ said Frankfurter,22 who likened 
Hughes presiding to Toscanini conducting.23
The Chief Justice’s case-stating prerogative probably contri-
buted to Hughes’ influence even more than it enhanced that of his 
predecessors or successors. By all accounts, Hughes was an out-
standing lawyer with a keen analytical mind and a formidable 
memory. He labored over case files until he had mastered them. 
At conference, he stated cases succinctly yet comprehensively, 
precisely, and impartially.24 The case having been presented, he 
concluded by offering his preferred resolution, and his statements 
of proposed dispositions often commanded assent.25 After listening 
to discussion, Hughes then summarized the Court’s position and 
reacted to the comments of the other Justices.26
In addition to Hughes’ task leadership, Danelski regarded 
him as the social leader of the Court who acted to ensure its cohe-
sion.27 Hughes was not a backslapping extrovert but maintained 
warm relations with his brethren, some of whom he had known 
for years before becoming Chief Justice.28 Hughes was sensitive to 
22. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 901. 
23. Id.; see also Felix Frankfurter, “The Administrative Side” of Chief Justice Hughes, 
63 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1949) (‚He knew that the manner of conducting the business of the 
Court affects the matter. . . . In Court and in conference he struck the pitch, as it were, for 
the orchestra.‛).
24. Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes vol. 2, 664–665, 673–674 (Macmillan Co. 
1951); Owen J. Roberts, Charles Evans Hughes: The Administrative Master in Alan F. 
Westin, An Autobiography of the Supreme Court 205, 208 (Greenwood Press 1978); Stone, 
supra n. 21 , at 407 (referring to Hughes’ ‚extraordinary power of accurate and luminous 
statement‛); Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief 
Justice Hughes, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 14–15, 17 (1949) (discussing Hughes’ skill in stating 
cases and his elaborate preparation for conference); Transcriptions of Conversations  
Between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 1:  
December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas1.html 
(accessed Apr. 13, 2011) (‚Hughes covered all those in a very, very efficient way. One of the 
reasons that he did that was, first, he had tremendous capacity, an unusual capacity to get 
things done very fast.‛).
25. Roberts, supra n. 24, at 208. 
26. Id.; Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40 
(1967). 
27. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 677. 
28. Chief Justice Hughes had served with Justices Holmes, Van Devanter, and 
McReynolds during his first stint on the Court. The Autobiographical Notes of Charles 
Evans Hughes 298 (David J. Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., Harv. U. Press 1973). 
Hughes maintained warm relations with them, even with the incorrigible McReynolds, 
who reportedly deferred to him. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 667–668, 670–671. Hughes was 
particularly friendly with Van Devanter from their prior service. William G. Ross, The 
Chief Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes, 1930–1941, at 19 (U. S.C. Press 2007). Hughes 
File: Goldstein.PublicationCopy.docx Created on: 5/6/2011 6:00:00 PM Last Printed: 5/13/2011 8:05:00 AM 
2011] Leading the Court: Studies in Influence as Chief Justice 725
the personalities and psychic needs of his colleagues, and he pre-
sided with tact. Hughes treated his colleagues in a courteous 
manner and did not let jurisprudential disagreements affect his 
interactions with them.29
Hughes’ command in conference was no doubt enhanced by 
his behavior toward the other Justices outside of it. When Justice 
Van Devanter fell behind in his opinions, Hughes would some-
times reclaim some assigned cases, but always with the comment 
that Van Devanter had been overburdened.30 The anti-Semitic 
McReynolds avoided social encounters with Louis Brandeis, so 
Hughes divided his colleagues between two annual dinners he 
hosted.31 Hughes developed and maintained a close rapport with 
Owen Roberts,32 and when Roberts was hospitalized for three 
weeks, Hughes visited him every weekday.33 Knowing that Car-
dozo would immediately begin working on an opinion on Saturday 
night if he received an assignment after the conference, Hughes 
withheld Cardozo’s allotment until Sunday or Monday to protect 
his health.34 So Cardozo would not feel singled out, Hughes also 
deferred sending assignments to Van Devanter, Cardozo’s neigh-
bor.35 He handled the delicate mission of suggesting to Holmes 
that it was time for the ninety-year-old to retire with such tact 
that Holmes immediately took the hint free of ill feeling.36 Hugo 
Black had voted against Hughes’ nomination as Chief Justice and 
had advocated the court-packing plan; yet, Hughes treated him 
with such courtesy and respect that Black became an admirer.37
and Justice Brandeis had overlapped for only a few days in June 1916, but they had 
known each other as practicing lawyers and had a warm relationship. Danelski & Tulchin, 
supra n. 28, at 171, 298. Hughes and Justice Cardozo were old friends long before Presi-
dent Hoover nominated Cardozo to succeed Justice Holmes. Id. at 299–300; Pusey, supra
n. 24, at 682. Hughes had served in President Herbert Hoover’s Cabinet with Harlan Fiske 
Stone. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 298. Brandeis and McReynolds, representing 
opposite wings of the Court, both endorsed Hughes’ nomination. Ross, supra n. 28, at 19–
20. 
29. Ross, supra n. 28, at 28, 219. 
30. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 667–668. 
31. Id. at 670. 
32. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 298. 
33. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 669. 
34. William O. Douglas, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 549, 549 (1960). 
35. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 678.  
36. Id. at 681–682. 
37. Id. at 773. 
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Hughes never lobbied other Justices outside of the conference 
room although he was open to discussing a case if approached.38
Hughes facilitated the Court’s work and generally won points 
with his colleagues by his efficient administration. He conducted 
Court business in a manner that was respectful of his colleagues’ 
calendars. Conferences began on schedule, and Hughes enforced 
the time allotted to oral advocates (it was said, perhaps apocry-
phally, that he once cut an advocate off in the middle of the word 
‚if‛) and was not afraid to end oral argument when no longer 
needed. Hughes typically circulated a list of cases he deemed  
unworthy of certiorari.39 Although it was understood that any of 
the cases would be discussed at the request of a single Justice, 
such requests came about once every other year of Hughes’ Chief 
Justiceship.40
Hughes put a good deal of thought into case assignments, 
which he considered his ‚most delicate task.‛41 Although Hughes 
claimed that he tried to distribute important cases equally,42 he 
was not averse to keeping a disproportionate number for himself 
(twenty-eight percent), a smaller percentage than Taft retained 
(thirty-four percent) but far more than did Stone (eleven per-
cent).43 He kept some important opinions for himself but also 
shouldered his share of the pedestrian cases.44 He often assigned 
controversial cases to the Justice close to the Court’s center to 
38. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 301; Pusey, supra n. 24, at 676–677; Roberts, 
supra n. 24, at 209–210 (stating that Hughes never discussed merits of cases with other 
Justices between argument and conference). 
39. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 672. 
40. Id. Hughes’ efficient approach did not meet with universal acclaim. Stone thought 
Hughes ran conference like a ‚drill sergeant.‛ Ross, supra n. 28, at 221. This left inade-
quate time for collective rumination of matters before the Court. Barry Cushman, 
Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution 101–103 
(Oxford U. Press 1998). Stone tried to fill this gap by sometimes holding Friday afternoon 
rump sessions, which a few Justices attended. Ross, supra n. 28, at 222; Melvin I. Urofsky, 
Division and Discord: The Supreme Court under Stone and Vinson, 1941–1953, at 31 (U. 
S.C. Press 1997).  
41. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 302; see also Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 904 
(‚No Chief Justice, I believe, equaled Chief Justice Hughes in the skill and the wisdom and 
the disinterestedness with which he made his assignments.‛).
42. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 302. 
43. David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 260 (7th 
ed., W.W. Norton 2005). To some extent, these numbers may reflect the Chief picking up 
the slack for ill or less productive colleagues, as was true of Taft, for instance. See Ross, 
supra n. 28, at 230 (listing significant cases Hughes assigned himself). 
44. Roberts, supra n. 24, at 209. 
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minimize division.45 He tended to assign each Justice a range of 
cases46 while considering the ‚special fitness of a Justice for writ-
ing in the particular case.‛47
Finally, Hughes worked to achieve a consensus as broad as 
the Court’s composition allowed. In part, he led by example. He 
rarely wrote dissenting opinions, and his institutional commit-
ment often caused him to acquiesce silently in a disposition rather 
than publish his disagreement.48
Hughes quite clearly commanded the admiration of the 
Brethren, many of whom effusively praised his leadership. Frank-
furter said that Hughes ‚radiated authority, not through any 
other quality than the intrinsic moral power that was his.‛49
Douglas regarded Hughes as ‚a great man.‛50 So, too, did those 
who observed Hughes in action. Robert Jackson wrote of Hughes’ 
‚impressive personality‛ and said he ‚imparted strength to the 
Court during our time by his character.‛51 Paul Freund, who  
encountered Hughes as a law clerk to Brandeis, as an attorney 
before the Court, and as a scholar, compared Hughes to John 
Marshall as a Chief Justice.52
2. Earl Warren 
Warren lacked Hughes’ technical skill as a lawyer yet appar-
ently presided with welcome authority.53 His popularity among 
his colleagues disposed them in his favor, and he apparently pro-
vided able case summaries that highlighted the basic issues for 
decision followed with a clear statement of his position, except in 
an occasional technical matter in which he indicated he would 
45. Freund, supra n. 26, at 40. 
46. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 678; Ross, supra n. 28, at 229. 
47. Danelski & Tulchin, supra n. 28, at 302. 
48. Freund, supra n. 26, at 37–38 (reporting that Hughes wrote only seventeen dis-
sents and six concurrences out of more than two hundred and fifty opinions). 
49. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 901. 
50. Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor 
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 7a: January 18, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/ 
finding_aids/douglas/douglas7a.html (accessed Apr. 13, 2011). 
51. Robert H. Jackson, The Judicial Career of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in 
The Supreme Court and Its Justices 142–143 (Jesse H. Choper ed., 2d ed., ABA 2001). 
52. Freund, supra n. 26, at 43. 
53. Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969, at 22–23 
(U. S.C. Press 2005) (quoting Justice Stewart that Warren was ‚ideal‛ in presiding over 
the conference). 
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join any majority for lack of his own preference.54 Warren report-
edly presided in a fair and efficient manner and resisted the urge 
to argue with his colleagues, a practice that had undermined 
Stone’s authority.55 Warren’s colleagues regarded him as persua-
sive in conference and a hard worker.56 He drew on the skill of 
others to enhance his own performance. Warren and Black often 
discussed pending cases before and after conferences.57 After 
Brennan joined the Court, Warren regularly strategized with 
him, meeting every Thursday before conference in Brennan’s 
chambers.58
Warren reportedly provided simple, but effective, statements 
of cases that focused discussion on the underlying moral values at 
issue. Warren’s eloquent statement at the December 12, 1953 con-
ference on Brown v. Board of Education59 was noteworthy in this 
respect.60 Although Warren said he favored ‚pooling all of the 
humble wisdom of the Court[,]‛ he proceeded to state that ‚sepa-
rate but equal‛ rested on the ‚basic premise that the Negro race is 
inferior,‛ a conclusion Warren rejected as inconsistent with the 
three Civil War Amendments.61 Warren’s comments, when 
coupled with the prior term’s discussion of the case, signaled that 
a clear majority existed to overturn Plessy and placed the consti-
tutional issue in a moral frame that virtually compelled the 
ultimate decision.62 Moreover, Warren astutely invited the confer-
54. Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court—A Judicial 
Biography 143–144 (N.Y.U. Press 1983). 
55. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice Warren, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1974) 
(praising Warren’s skills presiding over conference); Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 144 (stating 
that Warren would rarely contradict others at conference, and allowed each Justice their 
full say). 
56. Interview by T. H. Baker with Thurgood Marshall, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (July 10, 
1969) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/ 
oralhistory.hom/MarshallT/marshall.pdf) [hereinafter Marshall Interview].  
57. Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He Made 348 (Penguin 
Group 2006). 
58. Seth Stern & Stephen Wermiel, Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion 106, 183, 250–
252 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010); Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court, N.Y. Times 6 
(Oct. 5, 1986). 
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
60. Notes of Conference of December 12, 1953, in The Supreme Court in Conference: 
1940–1985, at 654 (Del Dickson ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) [hereinafter The Supreme Court 
in Conference]. 
61. Id.
62. See e.g. G. Edward White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 165 (Oxford U. Press 1982) 
(arguing that Warren’s statement used moral shame to attract support).
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ence to discuss, but not to vote on, the case to make it easier for 
those with misgivings about overturning Plessy to change their 
minds later.63 Although Warren was not solely responsible for 
achieving the unanimous result in Brown, he surely played an 
important role.64
Brown was by no means the only instance when Warren’s 
opening identified a broad principle that the Court adopted. In 
Miranda v. Arizona,65 Warren’s conference statement articulated 
the basic ideals and specific requirements that later found their 
way into his opinion and commanded the essential assent of five 
others.66 In Loving v. Virginia,67 he declared that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was designed to eliminate racial discrimination, 
but that miscegenation statutes ‚maintain white supremacy.‛68
Bernard Schwartz found from his review of conference notes that 
Warren was usually able to lead the Court in the direction he 
chose.69
Warren also excelled as a social leader, and his popularity 
with his colleagues presumably enhanced his influence. He had 
immense interpersonal skills. The simple acts of a master politi-
cian paid important dividends. When Warren first arrived at the 
Court, he went directly to Black’s chambers and introduced him-
self to Black’s office staff and law clerks—a gesture Black 
appreciated.70 He asked Black for a reading list to help with opin-
ion writing, and after Black suggested Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 
Warren immediately began to read it.71 He invited Black, as  
senior Justice, to continue to preside at conference initially. War-
ren greeted Potter Stewart and his wife at the train station at 
63. Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor 
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 13: December 17, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/ 
finding_aids/douglas/douglas13.html (accessed Apr. 13, 2011). 
64. See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the  
Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 Geo. L.J. 1, 1 (1979) (describing how the role of the Court’s 
previous unanimous decisions on issues of racial segregation started a trend that helped 
bring about the unanimity in Brown). 
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
66. The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 60, at 515–518. 
67. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
68. The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 60, at 695. 
69. Bernard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action 12  
(Addison-Wesley 1990); see also Belknap, supra n. 53, at 22 (stating that Warren could 
usually steer conference discussion). 
70. Newton, supra n. 57, at 277. 
71. Id. at 277–278. 
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6:30 a.m. when they first arrived in Washington, District 
 of Columbia.72 Warren routinely met other Justices, even those 
most junior, in their chambers rather than summoning them to 
his, persisting in the practice even when they protested that pro-
tocol demanded that they visit him.73 This show of humility—
institutional and personal—helped endear Warren to his asso-
ciates. Warren personally hand-delivered his draft of the opinion 
in Brown to each of his colleagues, even taking it to Jackson in 
the hospital,74 a gesture that signaled deference of a new Chief 
Justice for a senior colleague and afforded an opportunity for con-
versation, in addition to addressing the underlying confidentiality 
concerns associated with transporting the opinion outside of the 
Court. Warren won favor with other actions too, like lobbying 
Congress (unsuccessfully) to provide cars and drivers for the Jus-
tices75 or resisting efforts to increase the differential between his 
salary and that of the Associate Justices from five hundred dol-
lars to twenty-five hundred dollars.76
Warren also cultivated his colleagues socially—an enterprise 
that must have come naturally for someone Brennan recalled as 
being ‚marvelous with people.‛77 Warren and his family spent hol-
idays with the Blacks; he hunted78 and walked79 with Clark; and 
he attended sporting events and otherwise regularly socialized 
with Brennan.80 He persuaded all of his colleagues (except Black 
and Frankfurter) to join him at the Army-Navy football game 
most years; the Justices traveled to the game by rail during which 
time they socialized with one another and their families over 
breakfast and dinner.81
Save for Frankfurter and sometimes Douglas, Warren’s col-
leagues spoke of him effusively.82 Brennan regarded him as ‚the 
72. Belknap, supra n. 53, at 21; Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 321. 
73. See generally Leeds, supra n. 58 (citing Warren’s practice of meeting Brennan in 
his chambers as a reflection of Warren’s view that he was ‚Chief among equals‛).
74. Hutchinson, supra n. 64, at 42. 
75. Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren 347–348 (Doubleday & Co. 1977). 
76. Brennan, supra n. 55, at 3. 
77. Leeds, supra n. 58. 
78. Newton, supra n. 57, at 348. 
79. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 443. 
80. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 105; Leeds, supra n. 58. 
81. Newton, supra n. 57, at 350; Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 104–105. 
82. The Douglas Letters 124–125 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., Adler & Adler 1987) (criticiz-
ing Warren in letters in spring, 1961); Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice 
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Super-Chief.‛83 Stewart called Warren ‚an instinctive leader 
whom you respected and for whom you had an affection.‛84 Clark 
thought Warren would be viewed as the equal to, or greater than, 
John Marshall;85 Douglas ranked him with Marshall and 
Hughes.86 Marshall described Warren as ‚one of the greatest 
people who ever lived‛ and thought history would rank him 
‚probably the greatest Chief Justice who ever lived.‛87 Goldberg 
exaggerated only slightly in judging Warren as ‚beloved by all his 
brethren.‛88 Fortas said that Warren ‚provided an essence, an 
attitude, which set the tone and quality of the Court’s work.‛89
Warren distributed assignments fairly, making an effort to 
give all members some opportunity to write important cases.90 As 
with other Chief Justices, he wrote many of the historic decisions, 
such as Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe,91 Reynolds v. Sims,92 Miranda, 
Loving, and Powell v. McCormack.93 Yet he also bore more than 
his share of those less coveted.94 He often relied on Brennan to 
write delicate opinions or to preserve a precarious coalition, as in 
Cooper v. Aaron95 or Baker v. Carr.96 Yet strategic concerns prob-
ably dictated the assignments to Clark in Abington v. Schempp,97
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,98 and Mapp v. 
William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 11: June 9, 1962, http:// 
www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas11.html) (accessed Apr. 19, 2011). 
83. Brennan, supra n. 55, at 5. 
84. Belknap, supra n. 53, at 22. 
85. Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Tom Clark, Assoc. J., U.S. S. Ct. (Oct. 7, 1969) 
(transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory 
.hom/Clark-T/Clark-T.PDF).  
86. William O. Douglas, in Earl Warren—A Tribute, 58 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 4 (1970).
87. Marshall Interview, supra n. 56. 
88. Arthur J. Goldberg, in Earl Warren—A Tribute, supra n. 86, at 6. 
89. Fortas, supra n. 8, at 411. 
90. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 30; Interview by Joe B. Frantz with Earl Warren, (Sept. 
21, 1971) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/ 
oralhistory.hom/Warren-E/Warren-e.pdf). 
91. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
92. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
93. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
94. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 460–461. 
95. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Brennan did much of the drafting although the decision was 
issued as an opinion of all nine Justices. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 145–152. 
96. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 418–419 (discussing strategic 
considerations in assignment to Brennan). 
97. 347 U.S. 203 (1963). 
98. 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
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Ohio,99 and to Stewart in Katz v. United States100—cases in which 
a more conservative author might help keep the majority intact 
and gain greater public acceptance.  
3. William Howard Taft 
The Taft tenure demonstrated that a Chief Justice can, under 
certain circumstances, be highly successful without providing 
both task and social leadership. Taft, according to Danelski, acted 
as the Court’s social leader while his appointee, friend, and ally, 
Van Devanter, emerged as the task leader of the conference.101
Taft’s good nature apparently paid dividends in easing tensions 
on the Court, and he quickly achieved cordial relations with 
Brandeis,102 with whom he had previously endured high-stakes, 
public, and acrimonious clashes.103 The rapprochement reflected 
their reciprocal efforts, but Taft certainly did his part by going out 
of his way to be solicitous about Brandeis’ health and feelings and 
accommodating Brandeis’ views and suggestions when he could. 
Taft’s outreach was consistent with his ‚very genial‛104 personal-
ity, but it also reflected his desire to have the Court work 
collegially as a team.105 Taft valued unanimity highly and accord-
ingly tried to foster a climate conducive to compromise.106 The 
Taft Court demonstrated a high degree of cohesion, handing down 
unanimous decisions eighty-four percent of the time. Taft set an 
example in this respect, writing only about two dissents per 
year.107
99. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
100. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
101. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 677. 
102. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man’s Life 537–539 (Viking Press 1946). 
103. Brandeis had humiliated Taft during the investigation of Secretary of Interior 
Ballinger in 1910 by demonstrating that Taft had lied in his statements about his own 
inquiry into matters in dispute. Six years later, Taft signed a letter along with former 
American Bar Association presidents opposing Brandeis’ nomination to the Court on the 
grounds that he was unfit to serve. See generally Mason, supra n. 4, at 199–200 (describing 
how the two men began to mend relations after this event). 
104. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 898 (describing Taft as having ‚great warmth‛ and ‚a 
great deal of comraderie [sic] about him‛).
105. See generally Mason, supra n. 4, at 193–206 (describing ways in which Taft pro-
moted teamwork and unanimity). 
106. The Supreme Court in Conference, supra n. 60, at 74–75. 
107. O’Connor, supra n. 1, at 116–117. 
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Taft won favor with his colleagues generally by generous and 
sensitive gestures toward them, ranging from Christmas cards, 
rides, and gift salmons, to arranging for the funeral of Mrs. 
Holmes at Arlington.108 Taft’s conduct in assigning opinions also 
no doubt endeared him to his colleagues. He wrote more than his 
share of the Court’s opinions, in part because he assigned himself 
cases in areas like patent law, which others preferred to avoid, 
and he took on extra work when a colleague was ill or fell  
behind.109 Brandeis credited Taft with ‚admirable‛ personal quali-
ties, with smoothing out problems, and with conducting a 
harmonious conference.110
Although Taft lacked the legal skills that Hughes was to dis-
play, Van Devanter helped fill that void. Van Devanter’s writer’s 
block limited his output of opinions,111 but his knowledge of pro-
cedure and the Court’s precedents, as well as his ability at legal 
analysis were highly valued by his colleagues.112 He often strate-
gized with Taft before conference and reviewed memoranda before 
the Chief circulated them to the other chambers.113 Brandeis 
claimed that Van Devanter ran the Court due to his knowledge of 
federal law and his willingness to be helpful to his colleagues.114
C. Unsuccessful Chief Justices 
By contrast, the Chief Justiceships of Stone, Vinson, and 
Burger have not been regarded as successful in terms of leading 
the Court. The Court fell victim to internecine strife during the 
108. Mason, supra n. 4, at 205; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter 
Conversations, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 299, 336 (quoting Brandeis as praising Taft’s generosity to 
other Justices). 
109. Mason, supra n. 4, at 205–206, 231–232 (reporting that Taft wrote one-sixth of the 
Court’s opinions and averaged ten opinions per year—more than his colleagues for most 
years); Urofsky, supra n. 108, at 321 (crediting Taft with assigning cases fairly).
110. Urofsky, supra n. 108, at 313, 322, 333.  
111. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 136; Mason, supra n. 4, at 209 (describing Van Devanter 
as ‚‘opinion-shy’‛ and a ‚perfectionist‛); Pusey, supra n. 24, at 667–668 (referring to Van 
Devanter’s ‚‘pen paralysis’‛ as ‚almost an affliction‛).
112. David Burner, Willis Van Devanter, in The Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court 1789–1978: Their Lives and Major Opinions 1945, 1948, 1952–1953 (Leon Friedman 
& Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House 1980). 
113. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, in The Supreme 
Court and Its Justices, supra n. 51, at 319; Mason, supra n. 4, at 222; Alpheus Thomas 
Mason, William Howard Taft: President by Chance, Chief Justice by Choice, in The  
Supreme Court and Its Justices, supra n. 51, at 139–140. 
114. Urofsky, supra n. 108, at 310. 
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Chief Justiceships of Stone and Vinson, whom Herbert Johnson 
suggests ‚share the unenviable distinction of being perhaps the 
least collegial and most internally vindictive periods of the 
Court’s history.‛115
1. Harlan Fiske Stone 
Although Stone came highly recommended as Chief Justice,116
he proved miscast in the center seat. Stone conducted conference 
quite differently than Hughes, in part due to his reaction to 
Hughes’ style of leadership, in part because he valued unanimity 
less and dissents more, and in part due to his own temperament. 
Stone’s praise of Hughes for not seeking ‚unanimity at the cost of 
the sacrifice . . . of strongly held convictions‛ and for recognizing 
the historic role of dissents117 probably described Stone’s values 
more accurately than Hughes’ performance. Stone was more the 
academic than the man of action—a jurist whose contributions 
came more from his pen than his command.  
Stone often came to conference without having reached a res-
olution of the matters for decision. His statements of cases lacked 
the authority of Hughes’ renditions and accordingly others embel-
lished on them and competed for de facto leadership of the Court. 
Rather than presiding, he tended to join the debates.118 Believing 
Hughes’ efficiency sacrificed full exploration of the issues, Stone 
allowed discussion to continue interminably.119 Stone exacerbated 
matters by debating with others who differed with his views,120
thereby sacrificing any ability to police the discussions. Whatever 
the benefits of longer deliberations, they had negative byprod-
115. Herbert A. Johnson, Editor’s Preface, in Urofsky, supra n. 40, at ix. 
116. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fisk Stone: Pillar of the Law 566, 570 (The Viking 
Press 1956) (reporting praise of Stone from Hughes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter among 
others). 
117. Stone, supra n. 21, at 408. 
118. Danelski, supra n. 11, at 678; Mason, supra n. 116, at 790–792 (describing confer-
ences under Stone); Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas 
and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 2: December 20, 1961, http://www.princeton 
.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas2.html (accessed Apr. 19, 2011) (describing 
Stone’s practice of debating points made by each Justice who spoke).
119. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 902–903. 
120. Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter 152 (W.W. Norton & Co. 
1975); Transcripts, supra n. 118 (describing Stone’s practice of debating points made by 
each Justice who spoke). 
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ucts.121 Disposing of the Court’s work became a more arduous 
enterprise as additional sessions were required to complete delib-
eration. Rather than being Saturday’s work, conferences often 
continued on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.122 Moreover, 
disagreements between strong-willed members of the Black and 
Frankfurter wings of the Court often dominated the discussions 
and perhaps exacerbated some of the divisions between the Jus-
tices.123 Stone apparently made derogatory comments about 
Black, which later became known to Black, thereby tempering his 
regard for the Chief Justice.124
2. Fred Vinson 
Vinson lacked the legal skill of Hughes or Stone. He was a  
sociable person and a number of his colleagues liked him person-
ally.125 That did not translate into professional respect, however, 
from colleagues who viewed him as lazy and lackluster.126 Frank-
furter’s famous comment at Vinson’s funeral in September 1953 
(‚This is the first indication I have ever had that there is a 
God.‛),127 may have revealed more about Frankfurter than about 
Vinson, yet it reflected a perception that Vinson was more  
obstacle than answer in the Court’s effort to find a consensus 
solution in the then pending school-segregation cases. Even  
Henry Abraham’s effort to present an even-handed judgment con-
cludes that ‚overall, Vinson demonstrated an astonishing lack of 
leadership: the role of [C]hief [J]ustice was simply beyond his 
ken.‛128 Vinson at times upset colleagues by acting in the more 
autocratic manner of a congressional committee chair or cabinet 
121. See Mason, supra n. 116, at 793–794 (describing some of the consequences of long 
deliberations under Stone’s Chief Justiceship).
122. William O. Douglas, Chief Justice Stone, 46 Colum. L. Rev. 693, 695 (1946). 
123. Lash, supra n. 120, at 207, 228; Mason, supra n. 116, at 793–795; O’Brien, supra n. 
43, at 197–198; Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 39–40. 
124. Transcriptions No. 7a, supra n. 50. 
125. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 149; Interview by Jerry N. Hess with Tom C. Clark, Assoc. 
J., U.S. S. Ct. (Oct. 17, 1972) (transcript available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ 
oralhist/clarktc.htm) (recalling Vinson as popular with other Justices). 
126. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 149, 151. 
127. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 199; see also Transcriptions of Conversations between 
Justice William O. Douglas and Professor Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No.17: June 5, 1963,
http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding_aids/douglas/douglas17.html) (describing Vinson 
as lacking ‚the elements of greatness‛ of other Chief Justices).
128. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 191. 
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official in circumstances when such hierarchical authority did not 
reside in the Chief Justice.129 Vinson, though not otherwise a suc-
cessful Chief Justice, distributed majority opinions evenly and 
indeed kept few ‚plums‛ for himself.130 The Court rarely acted 
unanimously and dissents proliferated. 
3. Warren E. Burger 
Burger forfeited his roles of task and social leader by occa-
sional inept and obtuse conduct. Like Stone and Vinson, he failed 
to impose structure on the conference, to his colleagues’ regret.131
His statements of the case were reportedly unimpressive and  
often incomplete.132 He imposed little discipline but allowed each 
Justice to interrupt others and speak as long as he or she 
wished.133 As a consequence, senior Justices often spoke multiple 
times before junior Justices were able to make their initial contri-
bution, and often little was left to be said by the time the end of 
the queue was reached.134 Conferences frequently continued into 
the following day.135 Burger sometimes did not record conference 
votes correctly. Whether this failing was strategic or reflected 
carelessness, it was not appreciated.136 Burger did not distinguish 
himself as a jurist or command the respect of his colleagues.137
Other Justices rewrote a number of opinions in significant cases 
129. Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William O. Douglas and Professor 
Walter F. Murphy, Cassette No. 10: June 9, 1962, http://www.princeton.edu/~mudd/finding 
_aids/douglas/douglas10.html) (discussing Vinson’s act in calling a special session of the 
Court to review the stay of execution in Rosenberg). 
130. John P. Frank, Fred Vinson and the Chief Justiceship, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 212, 212–
213, 241 (1954). 
131. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200. 
132. David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court 52 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1992). 
133. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 199. 
134. Id.; Savage, supra n. 132, at 52 (describing Burger’s unimpressive conference per-
formance); Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 356 (describing Burger’s case discussions as 
rambling). 
135. Interview by Harold Hongju Koh with Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. J., S. Ct. U.S. 
(Nov. 1, 1995) (transcript available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/blackmun-public/page 
.html?page=366&size=640&SERIESID=D09&FOLDERID=D0901) [hereinafter Blackmun 
Interview]. 
136. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200, 202. 
137. See generally Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren 257, 272, 284, 315 
(Simon & Schuster 1979) (describing how Chief Justice Burger, at times, frustrated his 
colleagues with his leadership style). 
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he assigned himself.138 Unlike Hughes, he was not a proficient 
technical lawyer, and unlike Warren, he did not identify compel-
ling ideals to furnish a foundation for constitutional 
jurisprudence. Burger often joined but rarely formed majorities in 
important cases.139
Burger compounded his failings as a task leader with social 
shortcomings.140 He upset some members of the Court by moving 
a desk into the Court’s conference room and appropriating it as 
his reception room.141 Some colleagues resented his perceived 
practice of deferring initial comment and then strategically voting 
with the winning side so he, rather than Douglas or Brennan, 
would assign the Court’s opinion.142 His officious manner alien-
ated Blackmun, his childhood friend.143 The disparaging portrait 
of Burger in The Brethren apparently came in part from inter-
views with at least five of his colleagues, including many who 
were ideologically closest to him.144
D. William H. Rehnquist 
Just five years after the end of an almost nineteen-year  
tenure, it is too early to assess fully the Rehnquist Chief Justice-
ship. Five of those who served with him as Associate Justices 
remain on the Court,145 important papers remain closed, and the 
138. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 357–358 (describing rewrites of Burger opinions 
in Alexander v. Holmes Co. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1975), and Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)); Woodward & Armstrong, supra n. 137, at 
315–346 (describing rewrites of United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1975)).
139. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 11–12. 
140. See Joan Biskupic, Sandra Day O’Connor 106 (HarperCollins 2005) (‚The truth 
was that Burger’s personal style inspired rivalries.‛); Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12 (arguing that 
Burger’s ‚personal characteristics‛ exacerbated divisions on the Court); see e.g. Woodward 
& Armstrong, supra n. 137, at 269, 359–360 (describing instances that illustrate Burger’s 
sometimes difficult leadership style).  
141. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 327–328. 
142. Biskupic, supra n. 140, at 106; Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 356; Woodward & 
Armstrong, supra n. 137, at 100, 170–172, 258, 417–419. 
143. Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun 154–160, 185–188 (Times Books 
2005); Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Harry A. Blackmun: The Outsider Justice 275, 287–288  
(Oxford U. Press 2008). 
144. David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court and The Brethren, 18 Const. Commentary 
303, 304–305 (2001) (identifying Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and probably White and 
Rehnquist as those interviewed); see also Leeds, supra n. 58 (reporting Brennan’s criti-
cisms of Burger). 
145. See S. Ct. of the U.S., About the Supreme Court, Members of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (accessed Apr. 18, 
File: Goldstein.PublicationCopy.docx Created on:  5/6/2011 6:00:00 PM Last Printed: 5/13/2011 8:05:00 AM 
738 Stetson Law Review [Vol. 40
fate of some strands of Rehnquist Court jurisprudence still hangs 
in the balance. Yet a few words are appropriate, not only because 
of the length of his service (the longest since Melville Fuller died 
a century ago), but because Chief Justice Roberts served as his 
law clerk when Rehnquist was an Associate Justice.146
Rehnquist surely had his impact, yet it is unclear that as 
Chief Justice he led the Court in crafting sustainable doctrine of 
the significance of that associated with Hughes and Warren. 
Moreover, the disposition of the major crisis on his watch—Bush 
v. Gore147—remains controversial and the extent of his leadership 
remains hidden. Accordingly, Henry Abraham’s conclusion that 
Rehnquist was ‚a great [C]hief [J]ustice,‛148 seems generous and 
premature. Of the seven Justices who served with him just prior 
to, and who issued statements upon, his death, only Justice 
O’Connor used the word ‚great‛ in assessing his service.149
Nonetheless, Rehnquist appears to have successfully led the 
conference and left a mark as Chief Justice. If Rehnquist’s final 
group of colleagues generally did not label him ‚great,‛ the others 
all did use the words ‚fair‛ or ‚fairness‛ to describe him.150
Although Justice O’Connor said she liked Chief Justice Burger, 
she described Rehnquist as a ‚terrific‛ and ‚wonderful Chief Jus-
tice.‛151 Rehnquist presided in a ‚humble fashion,‛ ‚put on no airs 
at all,‛ and ‚held no grudges‛152—assessments that were not often 
used in connection with Burger and accordingly draw a contrast. 
She credited Rehnquist with preserving harmonious personal  
relations among Justices with divergent jurisprudential  
2011) (showing that the five remaining Justices are Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas). 
146. S. Ct. of the U.S., About the Supreme Court, Biographies of Current Justices of the 
Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (accessed Apr. 18, 
2011). 
147. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
148. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 277. 
149. S. Ct. of the U.S., Statements from the Supreme Court Regarding the Death 
of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/ 
viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName=pr_09-04-05b.html (accessed Apr. 19, 2011). 
150. Id.; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, in In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 
Harv. L. Rev. 3, 4 (2005) (describing Rehnquist as ‚fair‛); Linda Greenhouse, Court in 
Transition; William H. Rehnquist, Architect of Conservative Court, Dies at 80, N.Y. Times 
A16 (Sept. 5, 2005) (reporting on an earlier tribute by Stevens praising Rehnquist’s impar-
tiality in presiding). 
151. Sandra Day O’Connor, Response, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1673, 1674 (2006). 
152. Id.
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approaches.153 Kennedy described Rehnquist as someone who 
stated his positions forcefully, but respected the ‚deliberative 
process,‛ and who was ‚a brilliant, effective, and dedicated Chief 
Justice.‛154 Justices who often disagreed with Rehnquist on high-
profile matters, such as Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Gins-
burg, were among those who praised his performance as Chief 
Justice.155 That consensus signaled a professional respect for 
Rehnquist’s role as a task and social leader in marked contrast 
with their appraisals of his predecessor.  
Rehnquist did not see conference as an occasion to change 
minds, and accordingly, he conducted them efficiently without 
opportunity for extended discussion. Rehnquist also deployed  
opinion-writing assignments to achieve strategic objectives.  
Although Rehnquist initially would seek to distribute them equal-
ly each term, he would minimize assignments during the second 
half of a term to a Justice who was slow to circulate a majority or 
dissenting opinion or to vote in a case in which opinions had  
circulated.156 This practice, which was communicated to the other 
Justices, promoted efficiency in part by giving Justices incentive 
to complete their writing and to act so the Court could issue opin-
ions expeditiously.  
Just as Stone’s appreciation of Hughes signaled some of his 
own values, it is possible that what Chief Justice Roberts wrote of 
his predecessor may provide clues regarding his performance.  
Roberts admired Rehnquist’s intellectual curiosity, his lack of 
pretense, his direct manner, and his sense of whimsy, and  
Roberts described him as ‚a genuinely kind, thoughtful, and  
decent man.‛157 Years before his Court experienced a presidential 
153. O’Connor, supra n. 1, at 5; see also Savage, supra n. 132, at 362–363 (discussing 
the positive impact of Rehnquist’s interpersonal skills).
154. Anthony M. Kennedy, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor: An Expres-
sion of Appreciation, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1663, 1664, 1667 (2006). 
155. Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., A Tribute to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 58 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1675, 1676 (2006); see also O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200–201 (stating that Brennan 
and Marshall praised Rehnquist as a ‚‘splendid’ [C]hief [J]ustice‛); Savage, supra n. 132, 
at 14 (reporting praise of Rehnquist as Chief Justice from Brennan and Marshall); Black-
mun Interview, supra n. 135 (discussing Rehnquist’s fair assignment of cases); Jeffrey 
Rosen, Rehnquist the Great? The Atlantic 79, 90 (Apr. 2005) (available at http://www 
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/rehnquist-the-great/3820/) (describing how 
even liberals may come to view the conservative Chief Justice as successful). 
156. O’Brien, supra n. 43, at 200–201. 
157. John G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam: William H. Rehnquist, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 
(2005). 
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rebuke at the State of the Union,158 Roberts spoke admiringly of 
Rehnquist’s decision to skip one such occasion when it conflicted 
with his painting class.159 Roberts called his former boss ‚a tower-
ing figure in American law‛ and, more pertinent to this Article, 
‚one of a handful of great Chief Justices.‛160
II. THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT  
Success as Chief Justice, as in other leadership positions,  
depends on context as well as skill. Some background conditions 
remain relatively constant. For instance, the position of Chief 
Justice confers little hierarchical advantage. Unlike the Presi-
dent’s Cabinet, the Court adheres to ‚one person, one vote,‛ 
having done so long before the Court recognized that formula as a 
constitutional principle.161 The Chief cannot remove other Justices 
and, except for the Taft anomaly of a Chief Justice who had, as 
President, appointed some of his colleagues, cannot expect loyalty 
from grateful associates who owe their positions to him or her. 
Yet the context also presents variable elements that shape 
the historic possibilities of a Chief Justice. Chief Justices have 
presided under varying circumstances that presented different 
opportunities and constraints. Although history furnishes no  
mechanism to test counterfactuals, circumstance surely creates 
leadership opportunities and impacts outcomes and accordingly 
history’s assessments. Important contextual factors include Court 
composition as well as the issues that the times present. 
A. The Composition of the Court 
The makeup of the Court affects the context in which a Chief 
Justice operates. Composition may impact a Chief Justice’s for-
tunes in at least three ways. 
158. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. Times 
A12 (Jan. 29, 2010). 
159. Roberts, supra n. 157, at 2. 
160. Id.
161. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (stating that ‚one person, one vote‛ 
is a concept that has existed since the Declaration of Independence). 
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1. Ideological Balance 
Chief Justices need to operate differently depending on the 
ideological balance on the Court and where they fall on the rele-
vant spectrum relative to their colleagues. Some successful Chiefs 
have been centrists in the context of their Court. Taft, for  
instance, occupied a center position along with Sanford and 
McKenna.162 Hughes’ influence too, was enhanced by his ideologi-
cal position on the Court. He and Owen Roberts occupied the 
middle of a Court that often divided between Butler, McReynolds, 
Sutherland, and Van Devanter to the right and Holmes (or Car-
dozo), Brandeis, and Stone on the left.163 When Hughes and 
Roberts reached the same resolution, and sometimes when they 
did not, Hughes was able to dictate the outcome of many cases.164
Roberts was closest to Hughes personally and ideologically and 
that double proximity enhanced Hughes’ clout. 
A Chief who occupies the center position is in a strong posi-
tion to lead. The Chief’s vote can decide many cases, thereby 
expanding his or her bargaining strength. The Chief’s colleagues 
have additional reason to curry his or her favor. Not only can the 
Chief reward them through the assignment power, but he or she 
also can help those with strong predilections see their preferred 
outcomes prevail and perhaps see their views shape doctrine. 
Whereas Taft and Hughes gained influence from their posi-
tion at or near the Court’s center, Warren ultimately emerged as 
the leader of the Court’s liberal wing. In that position, he oper-
ated at different times in at least three distinct contexts. During 
the early years of his Chief Justiceship, he sometimes found him-
self as part of a minority faction, often with Black and Douglas. 
Following the appointment of Brennan in 1956,165 the so-called 
liberal wing grew to include four reliable Justices.166 This devel-
opment enhanced Warren’s position, not only by bringing him 
within a single vote of a majority in many cases, but also by add-
162. Ross, supra n. 28, at 20. 
163. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Court That Challenged the New Deal (1930–1936),
24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 65, 89 (1984). From 1930 to 1936, the Court was, however,  
unanimous eighty-five percent of the time. Id. at 98. 
164. Id.
165. S. Ct. of the U.S., supra n. 145. 
166. These four Justices were Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan. Stern & Wermiel, 
supra n. 58, at 183. 
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ing Brennan’s strategic skills to his coalition.167 This circumstance 
lent greater significance to Warren’s interpersonal skills, and he 
was often able to persuade Clark to join them.168 Once Arthur 
Goldberg replaced Frankfurter in 1962, Warren was the leader of 
a generally reliable liberal majority, which allowed him to achieve 
results consistent with his philosophy.169
Like Warren, Rehnquist was the leader of an ideological fac-
tion, yet his Chief Justiceship reveals a fourth position that can 
provide leadership opportunity. After Justice Clarence Thomas 
joined the Court in 1992, Rehnquist found himself essentially in 
the center of a five-Justice conservative block consisting of him-
self and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 
Although Rehnquist could not keep this group together on some 
issues of importance to him, like abortion or school prayer, he was 
able to achieve narrow majorities in a number of federalism  
cases.170 Rehnquist often wrote the majority opinion in the first 
case in an area in order to produce an opinion that all five would 
join before distributing the pen to others.  
And yet simply being part of the Court’s majority has not 
always been a measure of success for a Chief Justice. In impor-
tant cases, Vinson frequently was part of a majority consisting of 
himself, Reed, the three other Truman appointees (Burton, Clark, 
and Minton), and often Jackson.171 Nonetheless, Vinson is not 
generally credited with having constructed the coalition nor is the 
resulting jurisprudence as a whole remembered as historic.172
Burger sided with the majority in many of the most significant 
cases during his tenure, yet was not viewed as their architect. 
167. Id.
168. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 208. 
169. The Warren Court liberals consisted of Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Gold-
berg or Fortas, and Marshall once he replaced Clark in 1967, although Black proved less 
reliable in later years. See e.g. Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpreta-
tion, in The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective 1, 7–10 (Mark Tushnet 
ed., U. Press of Va. 1993) (illustrating how the appointments of White and Goldberg made 
a difference in specific cases). 
170. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 569, 575 (2003) (explaining that Rehnquist was 
able to fashion majorities in some federalism cases but not in those dealing with certain 
social issues). 
171. Frank, supra n. 130, at 243. 
172. See generally id. at 242–244 (noting that it is not clear whether Vinson was a  
leader to his colleagues, and explaining that he was not as effective in the Chief Justice 
position as he had been in others). 
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2. Complementary Allies 
The success of a Chief Justice may depend, in part, on the 
presence of dependable allies who possess talents that comple-
ment and supplement his or her own talents. Taft, for instance, 
was not a great technical lawyer but was able to rely on Van  
Devanter to provide that form of professional leadership for the 
Court.173 Warren benefited from the presence of Brennan, a mas-
ter strategist who was able to persuade colleagues to adopt his 
position and to craft opinions in a manner that would attract five 
votes.174
It is not enough simply to have friends—Stanley Reed had 
managed Vinson’s congressional campaigns,175 and Tom Clark 
was Vinson’s colleague in Truman’s Cabinet.176 Vinson and Clark 
often voted together,177 yet their friendship did not enable Vinson 
to succeed as Chief Justice.178 What adds particular value are 
allies who bring needed qualities to the table. 
Moreover, a Chief Justice can only exploit the resources the 
Court’s personnel provides if he or she fairly assesses his or her 
own limitations and needs, and forms alliances with those who 
can help him or her. Taft was willing to use Van Devanter or even 
Brandeis to provide the technical help his Court needed.179 War-
ren certainly benefitted from Brennan’s talents, yet it was to 
Warren’s credit that he recognized areas in which he could use 
help and was willing to seek it from Brennan.180 By contrast, 
Burger’s apparently inflated self-assessment may have under-
mined his ability to lead.181
173. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 897 (quoting Taft, who described Van Devanter as his 
‚lord chancellor‛).
174. David O. Stewart, The Great Persuader, 76 ABA J. 58, 58 (Nov. 1990). 
175. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 18. 
176. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 190–192. 
177. Frank, supra n. 130, at 245 tbl. 4. 
178. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 18, 155. 
179. Steamer, supra n. 1, at 176. 
180. See Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 205–206 (discussing the relationship between War-
ren and Brennan). 
181. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12. 
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3. The Dispositions around the Table 
The mix of personalities around the table also affects a 
Chief’s ability to lead. The tasks of Stone and Vinson were surely 
complicated by the presence of Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and 
Jackson on the Court. They were strong-willed individuals who 
approached many legal issues quite differently once the questions 
relating to federal legislative power and economic substantive due 
process were resolved in the late Hughes years. All were highly 
intelligent, energetic, and not averse to giving voice, written and 
oral, to their convictions. Their propensity to concur and dissent, 
sometimes at length, consumed time that might have been spent 
producing majority opinions. Moreover, Frankfurter and Douglas 
were capable of real nastiness, which introduced an acrimonious 
tenor to Court deliberations.182 The Court was increasingly  
divided, and often the opinions reflected the personal tensions.183
Of course, Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas also served under 
Hughes (and Warren) without being as disruptive, individually 
and collectively, as they were under Stone and Vinson. No doubt 
that reflected Hughes’ (and Warren’s) interpersonal skill. Hughes, 
after all, was able to manage a Court with McReynolds and But-
ler, neither of whom presented easy personalities. Yet Hughes 
also benefited from the fact that Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas 
served their first years on his Court at a time when they were 
still finding their way and had not divided ideologically or person-
ally. Additionally, they may have showed someone of Hughes’ 
rare stature a degree of deference they did not accord Stone, with 
whom they had served as a fellow Associate Justice.  
Warren won the affection of his colleagues with the exception 
of Frankfurter, who clearly irritated him.184 Although Jackson’s 
death in 1954 cost the Court a gifted Justice,185 Bernard Schwartz 
suggests that Jackson’s death may have eased Warren’s task 
because Black and Jackson were personally antagonistic to one 
182. Urofsky, supra n. 40, at 35–36. 
183. Id. at 39–40, 42–43, 137, 149. 
184. See Anthony Lewis, Warren Says Frankfurter Degrades Court in Dissent, N.Y. 
Times 1 (Apr. 25, 1961) (reporting Warren’s response in Court to Frankfurter’s statement); 
see also Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 253–257, 261–264, 286 (providing examples of the ani-
mosity between Warren and Frankfurter). 
185. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 205. 
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another.186 Frankfurter, of course, remained to stir the pot, but he 
also alienated many of his colleagues by the condescending man-
ner in which he approached them. A more politic adversary may 
have complicated Warren’s leadership task during the first part of 
his service. And Frankfurter’s retirement in 1962 made the Court 
more harmonious during the last half of Warren’s service.
Warren also may have been fortunate that the Court he 
joined included a number of former politicians. Black, Burton, and 
Minton were former senators;187 Jackson and Clark had been  
Attorney General.188 They no doubt had a fair measure of profes-
sional respect for Warren. Moreover, these men were sensitive to 
political considerations and, in many respects, were receptive to 
Warren’s approach to constitutional issues. Some who later joined 
the Court, like Brennan, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Fortas, 
were also rather pragmatic people.  
This discussion of Warren’s colleagues suggests another 
generalization. A Chief Justice’s influence also turns on how 
amenable his or her colleagues are to being persuaded. Warren 
served with a number of people who were more practical than 
ideological. They may have been susceptible to Warren’s reason or 
charm in a way that a rival ideologue would not have been. 
Taft and Hughes served among colleagues predisposed in 
their favor. Taft had appointed Van Devanter, with whom he 
served for sixteen years and played a considerable role in securing 
an Associate Justiceship for Pierce Butler.189 Taft almost always 
served with five or six other conservative Justices and accordingly 
was in a position to lead the Court in a direction with which he 
sympathized.190
Although Hughes experienced a somewhat rocky confirma-
tion battle in the Senate, he joined a Court that was glad to have 
him. Paul Freund pointed out that one attitude that Holmes and 
Brandeis shared with Van Devanter and McReynolds was their 
186. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 36. 
187. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 167, 189, 195. 
188. Id. at 184, 192. 
189. Taft also briefly overlapped with his appointee, Mahlon Pitney. S. Ct. of the U.S., 
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
members_text.aspx (accessed Apr. 18, 2011). 
190. From 1923 until 1925, in addition to Taft, the Court included Joseph McKenna, 
Van Devanter, McReynolds, George Sutherland, Butler, and Edward Sanford. Id. When 
McKenna retired in 1925, the more moderate Harlan Fiske Stone took his place. Id.
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pleasure in Hughes’ appointment,191 a sentiment widely shared on 
the Hughes Court. 
Other circumstances also gave Taft and Hughes some advan-
tages in achieving a consensus that Vinson and Stone lacked. 
Brandeis may have been a great dissenter but he felt a strong 
institutional loyalty to the Court. As such, Brandeis looked for 
opportunities to work with Taft, and on a number of cases, their 
common efforts helped achieve Taft’s ambition to mass the Court. 
Van Devanter had trouble writing,192 McReynolds was lazy,193 and 
Holmes was slipping during Hughes’ service,194 all of which may 
have reduced their propensity to dissent. Conversely, Stone and 
Vinson had Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson in their 
primes, a collection that made unity more elusive. 
B. What Arises on a Chief’s Watch
What matters arise during the term of a Chief Justice will  
also affect his or her opportunity to lead in a manner that history 
recalls. Hughes led the Court through the crisis the Court faced 
when the constitutional jurisprudence of the first third of the 
twentieth century collided with the politics of the New Deal.195
The Court was no doubt fortunate that Hughes was its leader 
when President Franklin Roosevelt proposed his ‚Court-packing 
plan,‛196 but that crisis also contributed to Hughes’ place in his-
tory by furnishing a stage on which he could star. Hughes drafted 
a ‚masterful letter‛ to Senator Burton Wheeler that refuted Roo-
sevelt’s arguments in convincing fashion197 and generally 
outmaneuvered Roosevelt. 
191. Freund, supra n. 26, at 8.
192. Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The 
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1891, 1944 n. 267 
(1994). 
193. Mason, supra n. 4, at 195, 215–217 (describing McReynolds’ aversion to work 
among his deficiencies). 
194. Sheldon M. Novick, Honorable Justice: The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes 371–375 
(Little Brown & Co. 1989) (referring to Holmes’ deterioration during his brief service on 
Hughes’ Court).
195. See generally Cushman, supra n. 40 (describing the clash that occurred between a 
conservative Court and the liberal New Deal policies). 
196. See Steamer, supra n. 1, at 23 (explaining that Franklin Roosevelt planned to add 
six more Justices to the Supreme Court to make a total of fifteen Justices). 
197. Id.; Freund, supra n. 26, at 27–30 (citing the profound impact of Hughes’ letter in 
defeating the Court-packing plan). See also McElwain, supra n. 24, at 5 (discussing the 
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President Dwight Eisenhower did not put Warren on the 
Court to handle the assault on ‚separate but equal,‛ but that 
work, from Brown in 1954 to Loving in 1967, essentially framed 
Warren’s service. Warren’s leadership in that area was certainly 
not all history recalls of his tenure, which included major doc-
trinal shifts regarding criminal procedure,198 reapportionment,199
and privacy,200 among other areas. But it, along with these other 
areas, formed a coherent record of judicial leadership that history 
has largely viewed in a positive manner.  
That Brown arose at the beginning of Warren’s tenure was 
fortuitous in terms of his professional standing. The unanimous 
opinion in Brown was rightfully seen as among Warren’s great 
contributions. It established his credentials in a way that pro-
vided an early infusion of capital in his account, with history and 
with his colleagues.  
The timing of Brown illustrates another important point. 
When matters arise may affect a Chief’s legacy. Warren may have 
been fortunate that Brown arose at the very outset of his term 
when leaders of the Court’s competing wings were vying for his 
favor and accordingly may have been more receptive to his lead-
ership. 
Yet the accidents of timing should not be overestimated in  
accounting for Hughes’ and Warren’s success. The appearance of 
great cases did not propel Stone201 or Burger202 to successful stints 
impact of Hughes’ statesmanlike handling of the Court-packing crisis on Hughes’ historical 
standing). 
198. See e.g. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491–499 (establishing rules to create a voluntary 
waiver of right against self-incrimination in custodial interrogations); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal case had a 
right to appointed counsel); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (holding that evidence seized in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment should be inadmissible in state-court prosecution). 
199. See e.g. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575–576 (1964) (holding that state legislative dis-
tricts in both houses of the state legislature had to be roughly equal in population); 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that congressional districts must be rough-
ly equal in population); Baker, 369 U.S. at 236–237 (1962) (holding that legislative 
malapportionment presented a justiciable question).  
200. See e.g. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the constitu-
tional right to privacy prevented the state from prohibiting use of contraceptives by a 
married couple). 
201. Stone’s first terms included the Court’s path-blazing First Amendment and Com-
merce Clause decisions in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 642 (1943) (holding that members of religious minority had First Amendment right 
not to participate in mandatory school flag salute), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 
133 (1942) (holding that Congress could use its power under the Commerce Clause to regu-
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as Chief Justice. Yes, the reputations of Hughes and Warren  
benefitted from the circumstances they were dealt, yet their pres-
ence and leadership also shaped American history and the 
position of the Court. 
III. DIFFERENT MODELS 
These sketches of recent Chief Justices caution against asso-
ciating success in that position with tangible factors in any 
formulaic way. The differences among the very successful Chief 
Justices far exceeded their similarities, and the qualities found in 
some successful Chief Justices also appeared in some who fared 
less well. 
For instance, extraordinary legal skill and experience help, 
but do not guarantee success, as Chief Justice. Hughes was a 
great lawyer who had extensive experience at the upper echelons 
of his profession.203 Yet the same might be said about Stone, who 
was Attorney General and a highly regarded Associate Justice. 
Warren, by contrast, had relatively modest experience as a law-
yer.204 Yet Hughes and Warren succeeded whereas Stone did not.  
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had served on the Court prior 
to being named its Chief. They were familiar with the Court and 
its operations. Their conduct as Chief Justice in part represented 
a reaction to that of the Chief Justice under whom each had 
served.205 Conversely, Warren was a neophyte regarding the 
Court. But for Vinson’s unexpected death, he was destined to  
late intrastate productive activities intended simply for a producers own consumption).
202. Burger fumbled leadership opportunities in early cases dealing with school deseg-
regation like Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. at 19, and Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 U.S. at 1; and with presidential power, 
like in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974), in part because his preferred disposition was at odds with that of the 
majority. Stern & Wermiel, supra n. 58, at 332–334, 355–358, 379–382.  
203. See Ross, supra n. 28, at 10 (stating that Hughes’ persuasive gifts were such that 
Cardozo, when on the New York Court of Appeals, would defer ruling for twenty-four 
hours on any case Hughes had argued to ‚resist Hughes’[ ] magnetism‛).
204. Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Earl Warren: Super Chief in Action, 33 Tulsa L.J. 
477, 481 (1997). 
205. Lash, supra n. 120, at 313–315 (explaining that Hughes believed White was fre-
quently unprepared for the conference and thus learned from White’s mistakes); Mason, 
supra n. 116, at 787–792 (contrasting Stone’s leadership style with that of Hughes); Ross, 
supra n. 28, at 220–221 (reporting that Hughes thought White failed to structure or limit 
conference discussion); cf. Rosen, supra n. 155 (discussing Burger and Rehnquist’s styles of 
leadership). 
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become Solicitor General to prepare him for a later move to the 
Court.206 When he arrived at the Court much earlier than  
expected, he needed to spend time understanding the basic roles 
of Court employees and observing a few conferences before he 
took the helm. 
Nor does prior judicial experience correlate with success as 
Chief Justice. Seven of the eight Chief Justices since Taft had 
prior judicial experience. Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist had 
served on the Court; Taft, Vinson, Burger, and John Roberts had 
been appellate court judges. Warren had not. The novice Warren 
succeeded as did some, but not all, of the seasoned jurists. 
Hughes, Stone, and Rehnquist were gifted intellects. Warren 
was not,207 although as Justice Stewart pointed out, to his credit 
he did not pretend to be one.208
Nor does prior relationship with others on the Court guaran-
tee success as Chief Justice. Taft, Hughes, and Rehnquist came to 
the Court with strong relations with most of its members and 
these prior relationships no doubt aided them. The same advan-
tage did not confer success on Stone or Vinson, each of whom was 
well acquainted with most of their colleagues. And Warren’s lack 
of a prior relationship with his colleagues209 did not inhibit his 
success as their leader. 
Even running conference does not need to follow one method. 
Hughes and Rehnquist apparently operated most efficiently  
whereas Stone, Vinson, and Burger were less structured. Yet 
Warren apparently allowed substantial discussion without loss of 
control.210
Nor does success depend upon occupying a particular place in 
the ideological spectrum. Taft and Hughes were centrists on their 
Courts but Vinson probably was, too. Warren and Rehnquist suc-
cessfully led factions at opposite wings of their Courts, but Stone 
also had been a somewhat ideological jurist, yet was unsuccessful 
as Chief Justice. 
206. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 3. 
207. See Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren, the “Warren Court,” and the Warren Myths, 67 
Mich. L. Rev. 353, 354 (1968) (‚Unlike Stone and Charles Evans Hughes before him, War-
ren can hardly be regarded as the intellectual or forensic superior of any of his brethren.‛).
208. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 31. 
209. See Warren, supra n. 75, at 276 (reporting that he knew only Clark well, and Jack-
son and Douglas slightly). 
210. Id. at 282–283. 
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Finally, the secret of success does not reside in the manner of 
seeking to establish Court majorities. Hughes avoided discussions 
of cases outside of conference unless initiated by one of his col-
leagues. Warren, however, frequently engaged in one-on-one and 
small-group discussions to good effect. His ‚persuasive powers‛ 
helped entice Reed and perhaps others to make the majority opin-
ion in Brown unanimous.211 Yet whereas Warren’s efforts 
enhanced his leadership, Burger apparently more often offended 
his colleagues through these efforts. 
Notwithstanding the absence of one precise mold from which 
the successful Chief Justices are cut, less tangible attributes do 
seem to be associated with successful Chief Justices. First, suc-
cess requires that a Chief Justice discharge functions with 
professional skill. Taft, Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist, in dif-
ferent ways, met this challenge. All worked hard, came to 
conference well prepared, and distributed work strategically, yet 
fairly. Those who have been less successful were deficient in one 
or more of those respects. Stone was not a leader; Vinson was 
lazy; Burger was mediocre. 
Second, interpersonal skills matter. Taft, Hughes, Warren, 
and Rehnquist were successful social leaders who conducted their 
relations with the other Justices in a collegial fashion. Disagree-
ment did not make them disagreeable. A Chief Justice’s charm 
cannot eliminate all strife,212 but social skills can mitigate tension 
and promote collegiality. Stone and Burger were less skilled in 
dealing with others. They could not draw from personal capital 
with their associates, and the atmosphere surrounding their 
Courts deteriorated. 
Third, those who were most successful understood both the 
limits and possibilities of their role as Chief Justice, taking  
account of the powers their position conferred and the context in 
which they operated. Taft, Hughes, and Warren understood  
rather quickly that their power came from their ability to per-
suade, and they acted to maximize their ability to do so. A 
211. Tushnet, supra n. 169, at 4; see also Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 90, 94 (describing 
Warren’s sessions with Reed on Brown); Leeds, supra n. 58 (explaining, from Justice 
Brennan’s point of view, how Warren was effective at persuading other Justices to vote a 
particular way). 
212. See Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 898–900 (discussing conflicts on the Court notwith-
standing Taft’s social talents).
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successful government bureaucrat like Vinson or law-school dean 
like Stone may find that being Chief Justice does not confer the 
accustomed benefits a hierarchical structure affords other lead-
ers.  
Moreover, those who succeeded managed to pursue achieva-
ble goals through appropriate strategies. Warren could operate 
differently after Brennan joined the Court than before;213 Gold-
berg’s arrival changed the equation further.214 Warren adapted to 
changing circumstances. Stone, by contrast, apparently failed to 
appreciate the peril to his position as Court leader of debating the 
points each colleague made.  
Fourth, the successful Chief Justices demonstrated aware-
ness about themselves and the context in which they functioned. 
Taft and Warren understood that they lacked some technical 
skills but borrowed them from Van Devanter and Brennan  
respectively. Conversely, Burger’s pretentious behavior alienated 
some of his colleagues.215
Fifth, it helps if the Chief Justice really enjoys shouldering 
the extra burdens that position imposes. Clearly, Taft, Hughes, 
and Warren relished being Chief Justice, and that attitude prob-
ably contributed to their success. Stone’s views were ambivalent 
at best. He once likened being Chief Justice to being a law-school 
dean, a position he had also held, because both have ‚to do the 
things that the janitor will not do.‛216 The administrative  
demands weighed on him, and he viewed them as a distraction 
from judging, the activity he most enjoyed.217 Burger gravitated to 
his administrative and ceremonial roles regarding the judiciary 
and legal profession and contributed in these respects, but one 
wonders whether his preoccupation with those parts of the job 
came at the expense of judging and working with his colleagues. 
The common ingredient of those who found success as Chief 
Justice was the ability to lead given the opportunities and con-
fines of the position. Leadership, Robert Steamer observed, ‚is 
213. See Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 205–206 (discussing the close relationship between 
Warren and Brennan). 
214. See id. at 446 (explaining how Goldberg became one of Warren’s strongest support-
ers). 
215. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 12. 
216. Steamer, supra n. 1, at 18. 
217. Mason, supra n. 116, at 581, 606, 639–640, 787–788. 
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intrinsic.‛218 It requires professional and interpersonal skill,  
energy, awareness—and something more. 
Hughes, Warren, and Taft all brought unique stature to the 
Court based on their imposing resumes. Hughes’ experience 
included service as Governor of New York, Associate Justice,  
Republican presidential candidate in 1916, and Secretary of 
State.219 Warren had been a highly successful Governor of Cali-
fornia and Republican vice-presidential candidate;220 Taft, an  
appellate court judge, Secretary of War, and President.221
Yet their stature rested on more than the credits on their  
resumes. Hughes, Paul Freund observed, exuded a ‚Jovian fig-
ure.‛222 One suspects his presence inspired a difficult bunch. 
Frankfurter wrote: ‚Everybody was better because of Toscanini 
Hughes, the leader of the orchestra. . . . One man is able to bring 
things out of you that are there, if they’re evoked, if they’re suffi-
ciently stimulated, sufficiently directed. Chief Justice Hughes had 
that very great quality.‛223
Hughes’ professional reputation and public standing also 
enhanced the Court’s stature. Jackson credited Hughes’ presence 
as helping the Court weather the storm during the 1930s when it 
abandoned some recent and long-standing precedents.224 Hughes 
was ‚a symbol of stability as well as of progress‛ whose presence 
‚gave the country a sense of steadiness.‛225
Warren brought some of these same qualities. ‚The most 
important feature of Earl Warren’s [C]hief [J]usticeship,‛ legal 
historian Ted White wrote, ‚was his presence. . . . He was  
regarded as one of the great Chief Justices in American history 
because of the intangible but undeniable impact of his presence 
on the Court.‛226
Ultimately, the greatest Chief Justices are measured not 
simply by their ability to lead, but by the direction and distance 
they took the Court and constitutional law. Hughes outmaneu-
218. Steamer, supra n. 1, at 31–32. 
219. See e.g. Pusey, supra n. 24, at 181–190, 271–281, 315–359, 411–425. 
220. See e.g. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 1.
221. See e.g. Mason, supra n. 4, at 20–21, 24–33. 
222. Freund, supra n. 26, at 13. 
223. Frankfurter, supra n. 5, at 902. 
224. Jackson, supra n. 51, at 143. 
225. Id.
226. White, supra n. 62, at 161. 
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vered Roosevelt on the court-packing plan and led the Court in 
doctrinal directions that accommodated the New Deal. Warren led 
the Court through doctrinal revolutions regarding civil rights, 
criminal procedure, and legislative apportionment. As John Hart 
Ely wrote of Warren, ‚[h]e was a leader because he was a man 
with a mission, and because the mission was good.‛227
IV. SPECULATING ON CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS 
Although it is premature to assess John Roberts’ influence as 
Chief Justice, the preceding discussion offers some measures to 
inform speculation on that score. Roberts certainly brings impos-
ing assets to his position. He came to the Court after a highly 
successful career as a Supreme Court advocate;228 he is perhaps 
the ablest lawyer to serve as Chief Justice since Hughes. He 
clearly is very bright and energetic, well versed in the work of the 
Court, and curious about it. His professional record leaves no 
doubt regarding his abilities to read and master an appellate 
record and the relevant cases, to frame issues in a compelling 
manner, to distinguish cases, to anticipate consequences of doc-
trinal choices, and to respond to arguments. Roberts’ formidable 
talent and success as an appellate advocate makes him well 
suited to lead the Court in its tasks. 
Roberts also gives every appearance of possessing strong  
interpersonal skills. He has a reputation for working well with 
people who have differing viewpoints.229 As O’Connor wrote, ‚[f]ew 
have made the transition as seamlessly and effectively as  
Roberts. He knew our traditions well, as he had clerked in 1980 
for then Associate Justice Rehnquist. His sense of humor and  
articulate nature and calm demeanor combine to make him a very 
effective Chief.‛230 Roberts does not bring the stature of a Taft, 
227. John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 11, 11 (1974). 
228. See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerk-
ships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1149, 1228–1230 
(2010) (describing Roberts’ success as Supreme Court advocate); Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s 
Rules, The Atlantic 104, 105 (Jan.–Feb. 2007) (available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2007/01/roberts-apos-s-rules/5559/) (describing Roberts’ success as advo-
cate). 
229. Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, The New Yorker 42, 44 (May 25, 2009) 
(available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin).
230. Sandra Day O’Connor, John Roberts, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,1187207,00.html#ixzz19cWN2SGn (posted Apr. 30, 2006). 
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Hughes, or Warren. Yet neither did Rehnquist, who nonetheless 
served successfully as Chief Justice.  
Some of Roberts’ actions suggest that institutional concerns 
may guide his conduct to a greater degree than that of most of his 
colleagues. During the last five years, he has voted with the  
majority more often than virtually all of the other Justices. As 
shown below,231 in three of his five terms on the Court, he voted in 
the majority as or more often than any other member of the 
Court. Of course, other explanations may account for this ten-
dency. It could reflect Roberts’ influence in shaping majorities or 
suggest that he is the Court’s pivot point. Yet it seems more 
plausible to believe that Roberts may sometimes join an apparent 
majority either to control the opinion assignment or to foster  
institutional solidarity or both, since the former may be simply a 
means to achieve the latter. 
ROBERTS JOINS MAJORITY OPINIONS
OT 05 OT 06 OT 07 OT 08 OT 09
RANK 1 2 1 3 (tie) 1 (tie)
PERCENTAGE 93 88.4 89.7 81 91
Not only does Roberts rarely dissent, but he writes fewer dis-
senting opinions than does virtually any other Justice. In part, 
the paucity of his dissenting opinions may relate to the frequency 
with which he is in the majority. Yet Roberts also seems to write 
fewer dissents than most of the other Justices with high majority 
scores. In fact, of those on the Court since Roberts became Chief 
Justice, only Kennedy has written fewer dissents.232 Roberts has 
never been the lone dissenter.233
231. Data in the tables at pages 754 and 755 is taken from the annual StatPack  
releases at SCOTUSblog. Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Stat Pack, http://www.scotusblog 
.com/reference/stat-pack/ (accessed Apr. 3, 2011). 
232. Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSblog, Final Super StatPack OT09, 14, http://www 
.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf (July 7, 2010). 
233. Id. at 15. Excluding newly appointed Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Sonia Soto-
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ROBERTS’ DISSENTING OPINIONS
OT 05 OT 06 OT 07 OT 08 OT 09
DISSENTING 
OPINIONS
3 3 4 5 3
RANK
7–8 (tie) 8 7–9 (tie) 7 9
RANGE FOR 
COURT
3–14 1–14 4–11 3–15 3–12
Finally, Roberts also writes relatively few concurring opin-
ions. In part, his opinion-assignment power may be a factor. He 
may be able to choose authors who write majority opinions in a 
manner that gives him little reason to supplement the Court’s 
written record. On the other hand, Roberts may restrain himself 
in order to promote institutional solidarity. 
ROBERTS’ CONCURRING OPINIONS
OT 05 OT 06 OT 07 OT 08 OT 09
CONCURRING 
OPINIONS
2 1 5 4 2
RANK 7–8 (tie) 9 6 6–7 (tie) 9
RANGE FOR 
COURT
2–7 1–10 1–10 2–9 2–13 
mayor was the only other Justice not to have filed a lone dissent, but she had only been on 
the Court for one term. Id. By comparison, Stevens and Thomas had filed ten lone dis-
sents, Souter four, Ginsburg two, and Scalia, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito one each. Id.
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Roberts has received credit in some instances in which  
observers have seen his hand in crafting relatively narrow hold-
ings that commanded a Court consensus instead of broader but 
divided results.234 Such judgments must be offered tentatively 
because the absence of information about the Justices’ initial 
positions sometimes obscures whether Roberts forged a minimal-
ist consensus as ‚an act of judicial statesmanship‛ or made a 
‚strategic retreat.‛235 His concurring opinion in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission,236 in which he defended the major-
ity’s opinion from the charge that it reflected judicial activism in 
reaching to decide an issue not necessarily before the Court and 
in not according proper respect to precedent, reflects concerns 
regarding the Court’s institutional standing although it might 
also be seen as an effort to plant seeds for later attacks on other 
doctrine. 
Yet Roberts clearly has not abandoned his convictions, and in 
some areas he has aggressively pursued jurisprudential goals.237
Quite clearly, he is not simply content to make the engines run 
smoothly; there are some directions in which he wishes to lead 
the Court. Other contributions to this symposium have explored 
the substantive decisions of the Roberts Court in greater depth, 
but a few snapshots may contribute to the evolving portrait of the 
work of its Chief Justice. 
Although other Justices have drawn their share of high-
profile, controversial opinions,238 Roberts has certainly not 
234. See e.g. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (issuing a seven-to-
two decision upholding, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a federal law authorizing 
civil commitment of a federal prisoner); N.W. Austin Mun. Util. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 
2516–2517 (2009) (authoring an eight-to-one decision resolving a voting-rights case on 
technical rather than constitutional grounds). 
235. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts Versus Roberts: Just How Radical is the Chief Justice? The 
New Republic 17, 17–18 (Mar. 11, 2010). 
236. 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010). 
237. Rosen, supra n. 235. 
238. See e.g. McDonald v. Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Alito writing a five-to-four 
opinion holding that the Second Amendment limits the power of states to restrict gun 
possession); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (Kennedy writing a five-to-four opinion 
invalidating restrictions on corporate expenditures in political campaigns); D.C. v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Scalia writing a five-to-four opinion holding that the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to gun possession); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 130–132, 168 (2007) (Kennedy writing a five-to-four opinion upholding the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute banning partial-birth abortion despite absence of exception to 
protect health of woman). 
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avoided writing contested decisions239 nor has he always written 
them in a manner designed to minimize the disputed area. Per-
haps the most glaring example occurred in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.240 Roberts 
assigned himself the opinion for the Court although Justice Ken-
nedy’s dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger241 must have signaled that 
any opinion Roberts wrote would probably speak for only four 
Justices on some points. Yet presumably, Roberts thought himself 
best able to write an opinion that would command at least four 
votes in support of a rationale adverse to virtually any racial clas-
sifications. More surprising were the arguments he used to 
portray Brown as reflecting an anticlassificationist vision of the 
Equal Protection Clause and his insistence that the attorneys for 
the black schoolchildren shared that vision, an argument that  
depended on a selective citation of sources read out of their histor-
ical context.242
In a number of important cases, Roberts has been unable to 
craft an opinion that would commit five Justices to a common  
rationale.243 On the other hand, consensus may have been imposs-
ible due to the ideological commitments of some Justices. In that 
case, the plurality opinions may reflect the intractability of the 
239. See e.g. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acctg. Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3164 
(2010) (writing a five-to-four opinion holding that a law unconstitutionally infringed the 
President’s power by giving executive power to officials beyond the President’s control); 
D.A.’s Off. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) (writing a five-to-four opinion denying a 
defendant’s constitutional right to obtain state’s DNA evidence in a postconviction proceed-
ing); Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (writing a five-to-four opinion 
holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable when an unlawful search is due to iso-
lated police negligence); Medellin v. Tex., 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (holding a treaty non-
self-executing and holding that a presidential order transcended presidential power); 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–410 (2007) (writing a five-to-four opinion upholding 
school officials who confiscated a pro-drug banner against a First Amendment claim). See 
also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (dissenting in a five-to-four decision 
striking down a regime for considering detainment of alien enemy combatants). 
240. 551 U.S. at 797–798. 
241. 539 U.S. 306, 343–344 (concluding that diversity was a compelling interest and 
endorsing Justice Powell’s approach in Bakke). 
242. Joel K. Goldstein, Not Hearing History: A Critique of Chief Justice Roberts’s 
Reinterpretation of Brown, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 791, 797 (2008); Snyder, supra n. 228, at 1237. 
243. See e.g. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62–63 (2008) (upholding Kentucky’s lethal injec-
tion protocol with only Justices Kennedy and Alito joining in the opinion); Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–798 (finding diversity to be a compelling interest and allowing 
some consideration of race in student assignments); Fed. Election Commn. v. Wis. Right to 
Life, 551 U.S. 449, 503–504 (2007) (Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas arguing for a 
broader ruling overturning precedent and striking down a statute).
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challenge rather than any failure on Roberts’ part, and his wil-
lingness to undertake the assignment may be evidence of 
institutional commitment.  
In addition to the attributes sketched above, Roberts has at 
least two other advantages that could greatly enhance his pros-
pects of becoming a great Chief Justice. First, he is an extremely 
effective and telegenic verbal communicator. His performance 
during his confirmation hearings was simply awesome and  
attracted widespread praise.244 Although twenty-two senators, all 
Democrats, voted against Roberts’ confirmation, he attracted far 
greater cross-party support, and accordingly far fewer negative 
votes, than any other recent nominee.245 Roberts won support 
from fifty-one percent of opposing party senators, a far better 
showing than other Supreme Court nominees in the last five 
years. Surely, his evident talent and his ability to project a com-
forting judicial disposition persuaded many Democrats to support 
him, in part by making that a position their constituents would 
accept or embrace. 
244. See e.g. Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th Chief Jus-
tice, Wash. Post A1 (Sept. 30, 2005) (available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.html) (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ 
confirmation hearing was almost flawless). 
245. Roberts was confirmed seventy-eight to twenty-two on September 29, 2005. U.S. 
Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1&vote=00245 
(accessed Apr. 3, 2011). Alito, by comparison, was confirmed fifty-eight to forty-two on 
January 31, 2006, only four months later by the same Senate. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll 
Call Votes 109th Congress—2nd Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call 
_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2&vote=00002 (accessed Apr. 3, 
2011). Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed sixty-eight to thirty-one on August 6, 2009. U.S. 
Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—1st Session, http://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00262 
(accessed Apr. 3, 2011). Sotomayor’s nine Republican votes included four who had 
announced their retirement. Id. Elena Kagan was confirmed sixty-three to thirty-seven a 
year later, on August 5, 2010. U.S. Sen., U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—
2nd Session, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm 
?congress=111&session=2&vote=00229 (accessed Apr. 3, 2011).  
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CONFIRMATION HEARING VOTES RECEIVED
OPPOSING PARTY 
VOTES






Roberts’ assets as a television performer coincide with tech-
nological change that may add value to those skills. Most of his 
predecessors served before the advent of C-Span gave the Court 
much prospect of substantial airtime.246 To date, Roberts has 
maintained a relatively low profile.247 Nonetheless, in his public 
appearances and interviews, Roberts presents himself as a like-
able figure who communicates in an effective manner. Roberts’ 
skill as a public and visible communicator is an asset that can 
enhance his, and the Court’s, public stature and develop support 
for its jurisprudence.  
Second, Roberts is likely to serve as Chief Justice for a long, 
long time. Earl Warren was sixty-two years old when President 
Eisenhower nominated him as Chief Justice. When Roberts 
reaches sixty-two, he will have served longer than Hughes did as 
Chief Justice. When Roberts reaches sixty-seven, Hughes’ age 
when appointed, he will have served longer than Warren did. If 
Roberts serves until the age at which Hughes (seventy-nine) or 
246. See Bruce D. Collins, C-Span’s Long and Winding Road to a Still Un-Televised 
Supreme Court, 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 12, 12–13 (describing C-Span’s cover-
age of the Supreme Court and its members). 
247. See e.g. Pew Research Ctr., The Databank, 8%—Chief Justice Thurgood Marshall?
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=1056 (accessed Apr. 3, 2011) 
(reporting that twenty-eight percent could identify Roberts as Chief Justice, compared to 
forty-three percent who correctly identified Rehnquist in November 1986). 
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Burger (seventy-nine) retired or Rehnquist (eighty) died, he will 
have essentially served longer than any Chief Justice except Mar-
shall.248
Roberts will no doubt encounter unanticipated circumstances. 
His opportunities to persuade may be limited if the Court remains 
ideologically divided and, in such a context, his chance to lead 
may depend on which side of the divide he is on and whether he 
has colleagues who are amenable to persuasion in high-profile 
cases. 
Yet, his anticipated tenure provides Roberts with unique  
opportunities. Like Hughes, Warren, and Rehnquist, he is likely 
to experience several different Roberts Courts as different presi-
dents replace senior colleagues, a process that has already begun. 
In all likelihood, he will serve with Court configurations that will 
provide a variety of leadership challenges and opportunities. The 
luxury of time allows Roberts to be patient in cases in which he is 
not immediately able to achieve his jurisprudential goals. For a 
protracted period, Roberts will probably initiate and direct confer-
ence discussions, assign most Court opinions, and have the 
opportunity to foster an environment conducive to the sort of  
leadership a Chief Justice can provide. For many, he will become 
the face of one branch of American government, and his image 
may define the judiciary for a long time. 
V. CONCLUSION  
‚A Chief Justice,‛ Philip Kurland wrote, ‚despite the public 
image, has little authority that is not shared by his colleagues on 
the Court, except that which inheres in his personal capacities.‛249
Yet what ‚inheres in his personal capacities‛ channeled through 
the few formal powers attached to his office has allowed some 
248. Roger Taney, the Chief Justice with the second-longest tenure, took office only 
days before his fifty-ninth birthday, and served twenty-eight-and-a-half years until he was 
eighty-seven. Abraham, supra n. 1, at 80. Roberts would pass Taney in length of service in 
spring 2034, a few months past his seventy-ninth birthday. Babington & Baker, supra n. 
244 (noting that Roberts was fifty when he became Chief Justice in 2005). Burger retired a 
few days after turning seventy-nine; Hughes did so less than three months after reaching 
that milestone. Maltz, supra n. 1, at 8, 10; Pusey, supra n. 24, at 786–787. Warren retired 
three months after his seventy-eighth birthday; at that age, Roberts will be about a year 
short of Taney’s service. Schwartz, supra n. 54, at 7, 764.  
249. Kurland, supra n. 207, at 354.  
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Chief Justices to lead the Court whereas others have simply held 
the title.250 Speaking in 1928, Charles Evans Hughes commented 
that John Marshall’s ‚preeminence was due to the fact that he 
was John Marshall, not simply that he was Chief Justice; the 
combination of John Marshall and the Chief Justiceship has given 
us our most illustrious judicial figure.‛251 Being Charles Evans 
Hughes or Earl Warren may also furnish a head start. 
Although the formal powers of the Chief Justice are limited, 
the manner in which they are deployed will affect the way in 
which the Court operates and the manner in which history recalls 
the Chief Justice. Recent history provides no single prescription 
for success in the role. Each Chief Justice operates in a different 
context, which will shape opportunities for leadership and the 
appropriate strategies. Ultimately, the success of a Chief Justice 
depends upon the manner in which he or she discharges his or 
her professional responsibilities and exercises interpersonal skill, 
and his or her capacity for leadership in the context presented.  
John Roberts may not be John Marshall or Charles Evans 
Hughes or Earl Warren. Who is? That does not mean he will not 
emerge as a very consequential Chief Justice. Whether he does 
will depend on his ability to marshal his professional and per-
sonal resources, to adapt to the context circumstances present, 
and to deploy his formidable assets in service of a mission that 
history recognizes as enhancing the rule of law. 
250. Id.
251. Hughes, supra n. 12, at 58. 
